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This research examines the evolution of Other Transaction (OT) authority, 
codified in Section 10 of the United States Code 2371, focusing on its use by the 
Department of Defense. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2016 made 
the OT authority for prototypes permanent; this development represents a significant 
milestone for OT authority. This research will provide an overview of where OTs belong 
among the standard procurement and assistance instruments available, review available 
literature on OT’s, and provide findings and recommendations for use of the authority 
going forward.   
The purpose of this research is to capture the current state of legislation with 
respect to OTs as well as understand how the statutory language has evolved since 
inception. The primary research questions focus on the current state of OT authority and 
what implications this has for the DOD going forward. The secondary research objectives 
focus on understanding the views of both advocates for and opposition against use of OT 
authority as well as understanding if there is a way to quantify the benefits achieved from 
use of OT authority. Finally, in light of the research, the questions of whether use of OT 
authority is in the best interest of the government as well as whether use of this authority 
should be expanded upon will be analyzed.   
The methodology used in this project includes review of Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) audit reports, DOD Inspector General (IG) reports, and 
studies by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), research by the RAND institution, 
and Senate and House testimony. Other sources include newspaper, web, and journal 
articles. Also, interviews with three OT subject matter experts provides valuable insight 
into the creation of the original language, legislative changes to OT authority, and 
challenges going forward.   
This research is important because the mission of the Department of Defense 
necessitates protection of our country from foreign and domestic threats. In order to 
remain at the forefront of innovation and technology, the DOD must attract the best 
xx 
sources and capabilities in various fields of study. Given that the commercial industry 
now drives innovation as opposed to the government driving innovation, the government 
must change its thinking and practices to be in concert with that of the market. The 
government must remove impediments to commercial companies not wanting to do 
business with the government in furthering R&D efforts by thinking outside of the box. 
Other Transaction (OT) authority represents such a break from the traditional 
procurement system by allowing industry and the government to create flexible mission 
focused agreements that are not unduly burdened by the traditional Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFARS). 
OT agreements foster an atmosphere of trust and collaboration and have attracted 
non-traditional firms that possess tremendous capabilities in advancing technology.   
The Three Integrative Pillars of Success (TIPS©) analytical framework model, 
authored by E. Cory Yoder, was used to analyze data on OTs in terms of personnel, 
platforms, and protocols. This research has revealed that although OT authority has 
become permanent, there remain several challenges to the successful execution of this 
authority. First, although agencies have been using OT authority, this represents a 
significant change in culture from traditional contracting processes, procedures, and 
regulations. Changing culture to provide greater awareness and acceptance of OT 
authority remains an area of opportunity. This research also revealed that there is very 
little training and guidance on OT authority. Further, there are very few experts within 
the federal government who are well versed in executing OT agreements. Research has 
also revealed that advertising has been a major challenge in promoting OT authority as 
dedicated platforms do not exist solely to advertise potential OT opportunities. Research 
has indicated that there are advantages and disadvantages to OT authority; unfortunately, 
while proponents advocate benefits, there is no magic formula for quantifying the 
benefits of OT agreements.   
In conclusion, OT authority, when used for the advancement of research and 
development, provides a powerful tool to attract non-traditional companies who 
previously were averse to working with the government. OT authority provides an 
avenue for government and industry to partner towards advancement of state-of-the-art 
 xxi 
technologies that will have and will continue to make a tremendous impact to the war 
fighter and national security.   
Now that the authority is permanent, it is time to execute and use the authority to 
the maximum extent possible to further R&D efforts. Recommendations include updating 
training materials to better equip Contracting Officers with an understanding of OT 
authority and how to craft effective OT agreements. Another recommendation would be 
to create a dedicated platform for advertising OT opportunities in order to attract a greater 
number of companies that possess the capabilities that the government desires. It is also 
imperative that the government think about succession planning and to have a knowledge 
management system in place to capture the resident knowledge from subject matter 
experts. It would be worthwhile to champion a working group that could capture lessons 
learned and best practices from executed OT agreements. A dedicated working group 
could also decide on how to best quantify tangible and intangible benefits of OT 
agreements. It is only through sharing these success stories that greater acceptance of OT 
authority will become part of the larger, overall federal acquisition culture.   
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This chapter provides a brief introduction to Other Transaction (OT) authority 
through an examination where OT agreements belong in comparison to traditional 
procurement contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements. This chapter also addresses 
the different types of OTs. The research objectives, specifically examining the primary 
and secondary questions that guide the research will be reviewed. Finally, this chapter 
will review the benefits of this research as well as the research methodology and the 
report organization.  
A. OTHER TRANSACTION “UN”DEFINED 
As stated in the article, “Another Option in a Tightening Budget: A Primer on 
Department of Defense ‘Other Transactions’ Agreements,” “Nowhere in the statute or the 
implementing regulations is there a definition of ‘other transactions’” (Cassidy, 
Plitsch, & Barclay, 2013). The authors are correct. Upon examination of Section 10 
of U.S.C. 2371, one will not find an affirmative definition of OTs. Rather, OTs 
are generally defined by what they are not. L. Elaine Halchin, in a CRS report, 
concurs with this characterization stating, “There is no statutory or regulatory 
definition of ‘other transaction,’ though, in practice, it is defined in the negative: an 
OT is not a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement” (Halchin, 2011).   
According to the GAO/NSIAD-96-11 report, “Contracts are to be used when the 
principal purpose of the project is the acquisition of goods and services for the direct 
benefit of the Federal Government. In contrast, grants, cooperative agreements, and other 
transactions are assistance instruments used by DOD when the principal purpose is to 
stimulate or support research and development efforts for more public purposes” (United 
States General Accounting Office, 1996). In an updated GAO report, OTs are categorized 
separately from procurement contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements. The report 
states that “…Congress established ‘other transaction authority’ for certain agencies 
through separate legislation. Under these authorities, agencies may develop agreements 
that are not required to follow a standard format or include terms and conditions that are 
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typically required when using traditional mechanisms” (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2016). Figure 1 illustrates that OT authority falls in both the 
acquisition and non-acquisition sides in terms of meeting contracting mission objectives. 
The authority granted by 10 U.S.C. 2371b refers to “OT authority for prototypes,” which 
falls more on the acquisition side but is not considered a procurement contract and is 
therefore, not subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR).  10 U.S.C. 2371 is 
also considered an OT authority on the non-acquisition side of the contracting tool box 
through “OT authority for R&D” and “OT for other” arrangements.  
  
Figure 1.  Contracting Tool Box. Source: DARPA (2015) 
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B. TYPES OF OTHER TRANSACTIONS 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the OT authority derived from 10 U.S.C. 2371 falls into 
three main categories:  OT for research, OT for prototypes, and OT for other.   
1. Research 
The initial OT authority was primarily intended to advance research and 
development. As stated in GAO-16-209, “Agencies may use other transaction agreements 
for a variety of projects and activities. For example, agencies can use other transaction 
agreements for research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) projects and activities 
that help advance new technologies or processes” (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2016).  “These transactions now take the form of technology 
investment agreements (TIAs). DOD will use a TIA when it wants to encourage the 
development of new technologies for future defense needs with entities that might not 
otherwise work with the DOD” (Cassidy, Plitsch, & Barclay, 2013). The following quote, 
sourced by the authors from the DARPA website on Other Transactions, captures the 
underlying intent of OTs for research/TIAs: 
TIAs therefore are designed to reduce barriers to commercial firms’ 
participation in defense research, to give the [DOD] access to the broadest 
possible technology and industrial base; promote new relationships among 
performers in both the defense and commercial sectors of that technology 
and industrial base; and stimulate performers to develop, use, and 
disseminate improved practices. (Cassidy, Plitsch, & Barclay, 2013) 
As will be discussed in later chapters, OT arrangements for research are exempt from 
many of the traditional procurement laws and regulations, thus becoming an attractive 
arrangement for commercial entities previously not inclined to do business with the 
government. To really understand the difference between OT for research and OT for 
prototypes, you could ask what the overarching goal is - If it is more to advance 
innovation or an idea, in other words, making an investment in technology, it would be 
considered OT for Research. If the ultimate goal was to get a working prototype, then it 
would be considered OT for prototypes.   
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2. Prototype 
In their article, “Another Option in a Tightening Budget:  A Primer on 
Department of Defense ‘Other Transactions’ Agreements,” the authors succinctly sum up 
the OT for Prototype legislation from the NDAA for 1994, stating “Congress authorized a 
second type of OT agreement for DARPA in 1993, under the notes to section 845 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994. This second type of agreement 
was intended for prototype projects related to DOD’s acquisition of weapons or weapon 
systems” (Cassidy, Plitsch, & Barclay, 2013). As will be illustrated in Chapter II, the OT 
for prototype legislation has really been the OT authority area that has changed 
dramatically over the years. For example, the definition of “weapons or weapons 
systems” as stated above now has a broader definition. Through an interview with Mr. 
Scott Ulrey, Deputy Director, DARPA CMO (personal communications, May 23, 2016), 
it was revealed that OT for Prototypes authority has colloquially been referred to as 
“845s” although changes to the original authority appear in many different sections (e.g., 
Sections 804, 241, 801, etc.) of the public law.   
3. Other Types 
Finally, the third type of OT arrangement is essentially an OT agreement for 
anything other than for RD&D or prototypes. This is a catch all category which leaves the 
authority available for the government to enter into agreements that have yet to be 
encountered. As illustrated in Figure 1, this could include arrangements such as 
bailments, lease arrangements, loan-to-own, and other unique agreements. Mr. Scott 
Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 2016) explained that: 
For OTs for research, which generally results in a TIA, those agreements 
are generally for dual use technologies and in order to do a TIA, there is a 
requirement of participation by a for-profit organization. When working 
with universities, the tendency is to enter into grants. However, one 
scenario using ‘OT for Other’ could be entering into an agreement with a 
consortia of universities. One could also have an OT for other agreement 
with a group consisting on non-profit organizations. You could have joint 
solicitations with industry. You could lease out R&D equipment.  You 
could loan out government property and eventually, the company would 
own that property depending on the terms stated in the agreement.  
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Another example would be technology development programs with 
foreign governments. Foreign governments have approached the 
government in response to a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) 
because they have a great technology and want to enter into an agreement. 
A foreign government is not a for-profit entity and cannot enter into a 
traditional procurement contract, grant, or cooperative agreement; 
therefore, an OT for other arrangement would be a possible solution. 
OT for Other is a category that really allows for the greatest of flexibility and is 
available when the OT for research and OT for prototype agreements are not applicable.   
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
The primary objective of this research is to present the reader with an in-depth 
understanding of OT authority by first examining the history of OTs and then presenting 
a thorough analysis of the current state of OT legislation. To accomplish the primary 
objective, the questions of what is the current state of OT authority and what does the law 
say and what implications this has will be answered.   
The secondary objective of this research is to take a holistic view of all available 
literature on OT authority in order to determine if the current language is sufficient as 
stated or if additional changes are needed. To accomplish the secondary objective, the 
questions of if the benefits can be quantified, do the benefits outweigh the risks, and 
should other agencies use this authority will be analyzed. The question of what is the way 
forward with OT authority will be examined and recommendations will be provided.   
D. PURPOSE/BENEFIT 
According to the DOD website, “The mission of the Department of Defense is to 
provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our 
country.” (About the Department of Defense, n.d.). The mission of the DOD is in line 
with the goals of the National Security Strategy (NSS). As stated by President Obama in 
the 2015 NSS, “Any successful strategy to ensure the safety of the American people and 
advance our national security interests must begin with an undeniable truth—America 
must lead”  (Obama, 2015). This research is important because for America to lead and 
for the DOD to provide our military forces with the resources to deter war, we need to 
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continue to advance innovation and state of the art through a focus on R&D efforts. OT 
authority provides a mechanism for DOD to leverage the capabilities of commercial 
companies, who are the current trailblazers in many fields of study. The DOD does not 
have the resources or the internal capabilities to remain on the forefront of technology; 
therefore, DOD must work in concert with the commercial companies that are driving 
innovation and state-of-the-art advances in technology. This research provides a greater 
understanding of an authority that has and will continue to provide meaningful impacts 
for our warfighter and for our nation.   
E. SCOPE/METHODOLOGY 
Fortunately, there exists numerous source materials on the subject of OTs. The 
challenge is ensuring a comprehensive review of all credible sources in order to provide a 
balanced factual representation of the many different facets of OTs. Over thirty sources 
were researched in preparation for this project. The DOD IG has issued several audit 
reports which review the award and administration of OTs as well as the financial and 
cost aspects of OTs. The GAO has issued a couple reports that present a comprehensive 
history and overview of OTs. RAND conducted extensive research on OTs which 
included examination of “72 projects during the 1994–1998 time period” (Smith, 
Drezner, & Lachow, n.d.) and resulted in several findings. The CRS also conducted its 
own research which resulted in a concise report on OTs that provided a detailed overview 
of the history of OTs as well as an analysis on the use of OTs and resulting policy 
recommendations. In addition to the aforementioned sources, research was garnered from 
journal articles, congressional testimony, industry briefings, and personal interviews. 
Overall, the tone of the research materials on OT authority was generally positive, citing 
its usefulness in attracting commercial capabilities; however, there were a few sources 
that were not as positive, warning of potential risks of using OT authority. This projects 
attempts to reconcile the literature available on OTs to provide the reader an 
understanding of the evolution of this authority from the past through the most recent 
changes implemented by the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. This research 
will present views from both advocates for and opponents against OT authority. The most 
meaningful insights were gathered from personal interviews with OT subject matter 
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experts who were involved with the initial crafting of the statutory language as well as 
from DARPA contracting officials who have been advocates for use of OT authority.   
This project will use The Three Integrative Pillars of Success (TIPS©) analytical 
framework model, authored by E. Cory Yoder, to analyze data on OTs in terms of 
personnel, platforms, and protocols. The premise of the TIPS© model is that the “three 
pillars MUST be examined for operational success.” A successful organization must be 
grounded in authorization and appropriation and Yoder states that “Nothing gets 
accomplished without the funds to structure and execute pillars” (Yoder, 2016). When an 
organization has the requisite authorization and appropriation and the three pillars of 
personnel, platforms, and protocols are operating in harmony, an organization is 
operating efficiently. This project will examine OT with respect to the three pillars to 
determine if improvements or recommendations can be made on DOD’s use of OT 
authority going forward.   
F. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
This chapter, Chapter I, provided a brief overview of Other Transactions by 
reviewing how OT is defined and what types of OTs exist. Chapter I also defined the 
research objectives of this project. Chapter II provides a literature review and history of 
OTs which includes an overview of the environmental and market factors that contributed 
to the DOD receiving OT authority and what factors led to the OT for prototype authority 
being made permanent. Chapter III takes an in-depth look at the statutory changes 
effected by the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act and also examines applicable 
laws, socioeconomic considerations, and legal implications of OT agreements. Chapter 
IV provides an analysis of the available OT data through the lens of the Three Integrative 
Pillars of Success analytical framework authored by E. Cory Yoder. Chapter IV will 
presents findings in terms of personnel, platforms, and protocols and will also review the 
advantages/benefits, disadvantages/risks, and lessons learned with respect to OT 
authority. Finally, Chapter V will present research conclusions and recommendations for 
possible implementation.   
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G. SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter provided an understanding of what an OT is not and 
discussed the various type of OT arrangements authorized under 10 U.S.C. 2371. This 
chapter also defined the project objectives, scope/methodology, and report organization. 
Most importantly, this chapter discussed why this research is critical as it is in support of 
continuing to advance state-of-the-art innovation and technology in ultimate support of 
our warfighter in defense of our great nation.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HISTORY OF OT 
The previous chapter provided a brief overview of OT authority and defined the 
research objectives. This chapter examines the environmental and market factors which 
set the stage for the DOD to obtain Other Transaction (OT) authority and which also 
contributed towards the OT for prototype authority to be made permanent. This chapter 
also reviews DOD’s history with OT authority and will also briefly review other agencies 
that were granted OT authority.   
A. ENVIRONMENTAL AND MARKET FACTORS 
There were several environment and market factors which paved the way for the 
DOD to gain OT authority. The Space Agreement Act and the advent of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) planted the seeds of “Other 
Transactions” as alternative agreements to the traditional procurement contract, grant, 
and cooperative agreement that were traditionally used to accomplish mission objectives. 
Changes in the Science and Technology (S&T) community combined with the 
commercial market’s aversion to doing business with the government also forced 
Department leaders to think outside the box for a solution that would foster collaboration 
with the commercial market. Finally, a continuing focus on acquisition reform further 
helped to shape an environment that would be conducive to creation of an alternative 
authority.   
1. NASA and the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 
Surya Gablin Gunasekara (2011), author of “Other Transaction Authority:  
NASA’s Dynamic Acquisition Instrument for the Commercialization of Manned 
Spaceflight or Cold War Relic?” quotes from 42 U.S.C. § 2473(c) (5) that “The Space 
Act provides NASA with the authority to ‘enter into and perform such contracts, leases, 
cooperative agreements, or other transactions as may be necessary in the conduct’ of 
NASA’s mission or as the agency may deem appropriate.” Gunasekara describes the 
competitive environment between the United States and Russia with respect to space 
exploration. In her article, Gunasekara (2011) quotes the following passage from Paul 
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Dembling’s “The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958: Revisited” stating, “On 
October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik into orbit and for the 
first time, the United States realized that it was behind in the space race. There was a 
sense of surprise and ‘bitter disappointment’ in the U.S. space community.” This sense of 
being technologically behind did not sit well with the U.S. and consequently, NASA was 
born and was afforded wide latitude to accomplish its mission.   
In “Injecting New Ideas and New Approaches in Defense Systems - Are ‘Other 
Transactions’ An Answer?,” author Richard L. Dunn (2009) provides further insight as to 
how NASA interpreted this unique authority and gives an example of NASA 
collaborating with AT&T:  
In addition to utilizing the basic contracting laws, NASA used this 
alternative authority selectively to enter into a variety of innovative 
contractual relationships with the interpretation that the contracting laws 
did not apply to “other transactions” (usually referred to as “Space Act 
agreements”). The first active communications satellite was actually 
privately owned and developed at no expense to NASA, which launched 
the satellite on a reimbursable basis for AT&T. The technical reports on 
Telstar that the author delivered to NASA looked exactly like technical 
reports delivered under a government procurement contract. The 
relationship between NASA and AT&T became a model for a class of 
“other transactions” called launch service agreements. Over the years, 
NASA has found many applications for “other transactions” structured as 
funded, unfunded or reimbursable arrangements.   
 Several sources credit the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 as being 
the originating source of “other transaction” authority. As you will see later in this 
chapter, thanks to the pioneers at NASA, there are now numerous other agencies that 
have been granted OT authority.  
2. Changes in the Science and Technology Market 
Ms. Halchin, author of a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report titled 
“Other Transaction (OT) Authority,” quotes a passage from Ms. Diane Sidebottom’s 
article titled “Intellectual Property in Federal Government Contracts: the Past, the 
Present, and One Possible Future,” that truly captures the changes that were taking place 
in the Science and Technology community: 
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Elaborating on how the government’s circumstances have changed, Diane 
M. Sidebottom wrote the following: [In the past,] ... the Government was a 
large customer of ... complex technologies and was often the only 
customer for production quantities of some of the more expensive 
inventions. While Government still has deep pockets, these pockets are 
nowhere near as deep as they were in the past. Massive budget cutbacks 
across the board have put the Government in the interesting position of 
being just another customer of technology and often not the largest 
customer at that. More and more, the Government is relying on 
commercial off-the-shelf technologies and leveraging the investment in 
technology that is being made privately by commercial industry. The 
situation has changed so much that many corporations are refusing to do 
business with the Government because its regulatory rules are too onerous. 
The Government is finding that not only can it not acquire many of the 
technologies it needs, but also many corporations will not even accept 
government dollars to help develop new technologies. 
In a brief at a DARPA business conference, Mr. Scott Ulrey (2016b) also 
described the changes in the S&T community as being a major driver that bolstered the 
push for the OT for prototype authority to be made permanent. Mr. Ulrey accurately 
explains that “In the past, innovation was fueled by the government while now, 
innovation is fueled by the commercial market.” He also states that “In the past, DOD 
was the primary driver of technology innovation by making substantial investments in 
R&D in the defense industrial base. In the present, the focus and pace of S&T innovation 
and its environment in leading technology areas shifted from government to the 
commercial sector.” Finally, Mr. Ulrey (2016b) states that “In the past, DOD powered a 
technology advantage on the battlefield with its investments in R&D while in the present, 
DOD works with the commercial sector to maintain a technology advantage on the 
battlefield.” The shift of the dynamics in the S&T community as described by Ms. 
Sidebottom and Mr. Ulrey was a significant consideration that caused DOD leadership to 
advocate for an authority that would allow the government to more easily work with the 
commercial market.   
3. Commercial Firms Averse to Working with the Government 
Commercial firms are wary of working with the federal government for a host of 
reasons, but the literature suggests that the main sources of contention revolve around 
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guarding intellectual property, the requirement to comply with regulations such as the 
FAR and DFARS, and the requirements of complying with FAR Part 31 and cost 
accounting standards.   
a. Intellectual Property 
Mr. Richard Kuyath (1998) stated in his article “Intellectual Property Rights 
under Department of Defense ‘Other Transactions’” that “The rigid and complex statutes 
and regulations governing Government Intellectual Property (IP) rights under 
procurement contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements prevent some commercial 
companies from performing Government-funded R&D projects.” IP represents a 
company’s unique ideas and innovations and is an integral part of their identity. It is 
natural for companies to want to protect their intellectual property rights.  Frank Kendall 
(2016), Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD/
AT&L), recognizes this fact and states in “Our Theme for 2016 – Sustaining 
Momentum”: 
It’s perfectly legitimate for a company to expect a reasonable return on the 
intellectual property it has developed or acquired. In general, that return 
should be in the commercial advantage conveyed by superior technology 
or lower costs. On the other hand, the use of intellectual property by a firm 
to sustain a decades-long grip on the aftermarket for a product is 
something the DOD should and can work to prevent. 
The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act played a significant role in deterring R&D 
participation by commercial firms. As stated in “Another Option in a Tightening Budget:  
A Primer on Department of Defense ‘Other Transactions’ Agreements”: 
In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, which created a uniform 
patent policy for inventions resulting from federally sponsored research 
and development agreements. The Act was initially applicable to small 
businesses, universities, and other nonprofit organizations and gave them 
the right to retain title to and profit from their inventions if they met 
certain requirements. The government retained a nonexclusive, 
nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up (royalty-free) license to use the 
invention. On February 18, 1983, President Ronald Reagan issued a 
presidential memorandum that extended the patent policy of Bayh-Dole to 
any invention made in the performance of federally funded research and 
development contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements to the extent 
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permitted by law. On April 10, 1987, President Reagan issued Executive 
Order 12591, which directed federal agencies to extend the Bayh Dole 
policies to “all businesses.” (Cassidy, Plitsch, & Barclay, 2013) 
The Bayh-Dole Act continued to grow in scope and sphere of influence and as one can 
imagine, giving up these rights to the government was not appealing to firms in the 
commercial marketplace. One of the reasons that OT agreements are viewed positively 
by industry has to do with the flexibility of these agreements in negotiating favorable IP 
terms. Mr. Kuyath (1998) speaks to the benefits of OT arrangements with respect to IP 
rights:   
In conclusion, OTs offer tremendous flexibility to the parties to negotiate 
intellectual property rights that not only satisfy the Government’s 
minimum needs but also grant sufficient rights to encourage contractors to 
commercialize the technology developed under the OT. This flexibility 
enables DOD to attract more firms to perform Government-funded R&D, 
particularly those commercial firms that, in the past, have been unwilling 
to perform Government-funded R&D. 
b. Regulations 
Another impediment to the commercial market working with the government to 
advance R&D has to do with an aversion to the overly burdensome regulations known as 
the FAR and DFARS. The FAR and DFARS are the body of regulations which govern 
traditional government acquisition. There are hundreds of clauses which may end up in a 
procurement contract and the number and type depend upon a variety of factors. There 
are different clauses for commercial versus non-commercial contracts. There are nuances 
in clause selection dependent upon dollar value and contract type. The clauses prescribed 
by the FAR and DFARS were intended to be safeguards; however, over time, the system 
has resulted in producing an overabundance of clauses and a perception of complexity.  
In his article, “Measuring ‘Other Transaction’ Authority Performance Versus Traditional 
Contracting Performance: A Missing Link to Further Acquisition Reform,” Major 
Gregory J. Fike (2009) states “Special emphasis is placed on a 1994 DOD procurement 
cost study conducted by Coopers and Lybrand in association with The Analytic Sciences 
Corporation, Inc. (TASC), which estimated that on average DOD specific acquisition 
regulations cause an eighteen percent cost increase in DOD acquisition programs.” The 
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Coopers and Lybrand study was an eye opening study in an era of acquisition reform as it 
was one of the first studies which quantified the cost of these regulations.   
c. Cost Accounting System 
Another impediment to commercial firms working with the federal government 
involves the requirements of having to adhere to principles of FAR 31 and having an 
adequate cost accounting system. Author Gregory Fike (2009) states that “A 1992 
congressional study found that “[the] Defense Department provisions requiring 
compliance with the Government Cost Accounting Standards and the Truth in 
Negotiations Act are serious impediments to commercial companies wishing to sell to the 
department.”  
This assertion is also supported in GAO-16-209 which states “We previously 
reported that nontraditional contractors generally do not operate accounting systems in 
compliance with cost accounting standards, and that developing such systems can be 
cost-prohibitive, according to entities and outside procurement experts” (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2016). The report also states that “When agencies use 
other transaction agreements, however, agencies do not have to require entities to meet 
government cost accounting standards and do not require entities to use accounting 
systems that adhere to these standards” (United States Government Accountability 
Office, 2016). GAO-16-209 also provides a specific example of how an OT agreement 
can alleviate a company’s concerns about cost accounting standards: 
DOE officials cited an example in which they used an other transaction 
agreement to address a company’s concerns regarding government cost 
accounting standards. DOE entered into an other transaction agreement in 
2008, which is expected to continue through 2017, with a company that 
had not previously worked with the government. The agreement was for 
the design, construction, and operation of a bio refinery plant capable of 
producing large amounts of ethanol. According to DOE officials, the 
company brought needed expertise to the project but had not previously 
worked with the government and did not have a government-approved 
cost accounting system. DOE used the flexibility of its other transaction 
authority to create an agreement whereby the company was not required to 
adhere to government cost accounting standards or use a government-
approved cost accounting system. However, the agreement did include 
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some requirements for the company’s cost accounting system. (United 
States Government Accountability Office, 2016)  
Having to adhere to the Government’s cost accounting standards is a real concern 
for many companies that are not used to doing business with the government. OT 
authority has provided a means to address this concern with many companies being 
allowed to adhere to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) instead of the 
government’s cost accounting standards.   
4. Acquisition Reform 
Along with changes in the S&T community, there was also a strong push for 
acquisition reform in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. Although acquisition 
reform continues today through Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives, the 1990s was 
really the height of reform efforts, which saw the creation of legislation such as the 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA). FARA and FASA were examples of procurement reform legislation that focused 
on commercial item acquisition, promoted performance based contracting, and aimed to 
streamline the acquisition process. Describing the sentiment at the time, quoting from a 
GAO Report and RAND research study, Mr. Fike (2009) states:   
Congress and DOD were concerned that government unique procurement 
requirements required by the FAR ‘inhibited DOD’s ability to take 
advantage of technological advances made by the private sector and 
increased the costs of goods and services DOD acquired.’  Many of the 
studies conducted in the early 1990s revealed that contractor compliance 
with government unique acquisition provisions imposed a significant “cost 
premium” on government-procured items. The results of the studies 
indicated that government regulation increased the costs of DOD contracts 
anywhere from 5% to 200%. 
The studies referenced in the above quotation provided ammunition for acquisition 
reformists to push for authorities and legislation that would make the acquisition process 
more efficient. The environment of acquisition reform would prove conducive for the 
DOD to eventually gain OT authority, an authority which represented a departure from 
traditional government procurement processes and procedures.   
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Acquisition reform continues to remain a focus of present day DOD policy 
makers. Initiatives such as BBP, authored by Ashton Carter and Frank Kendall, has been 
published as versions 1.0, 2.0, and most recently 3.0. Rear Admiral (RADM) Allie 
Coetzee (2015) of the United States Navy (USN) stated in “Reward Industry for 
Innovative Outcomes” that:  
The overarching theme of Better Buying Power (BBP) 3.0 is achieving 
dominant capabilities through technical excellence and innovation. To 
help achieve these goals, the Department of Defense (DOD) is 
reexamining business arrangements, so we can: (1) attract and enable a 
broader array of industry participants; (2) employ techniques that will 
motivate industry to deliver tangible results that advance combat 
capabilities; and (3) recognize that deliberate speed is required to stay 
ahead and remain on the cutting edge. 
In “Our Theme for 2016 – Sustaining Momentum,” Frank Kendall (2016) stated “My 
concerns about technological superiority that motivated this edition of BBP are 
reinforced every time I receive a daily intelligence update.” The continuing focus on 
acquisition reform has certainly been a favorable factor in producing an environment 
conducive to DOD being granted permanent OT authority.   
B. DOD OT AUTHORITY AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 
1. Fiscal Year 1990:  DARPA Receives OT Authority 
In light of the changes transpiring in the S&T community combined with the 
environment of acquisition reform and the need to accomplish its mission, through the 
efforts of Mr. Richard Dunn (personal communications, May 31, 2016), then General 
Counsel at DARPA, in concert with the support of then Senator Nunn of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, DARPA called for creation of an authority that would allow 
flexibility not afforded by traditional means. DARPA was ultimately successful in this 
endeavor and as stated by Mr. Dunn, “In 1989, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) sought and received authority to enter into ‘other transactions’ (OTs) 
to support basic, applied and advanced research. This authority could be used when 
standard procurement contracts and grants were not feasible or appropriate” (Dunn, 
Injecting New Ideas and New Approaches in Defense Systems - Are “Other 
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Transactions” An Answer?, 2009). The original authority, codified in 10 U.S.C 2371, 
appeared in Section 251 of Public Law 101-189, and was a permanent authority 
promoting “dual use “ technology, meaning promoting investments in research that could 
have both a commercial and military application. In Fiscal Year 1990, there was no 
specific authority for prototyping; however, per Mr. Scott Ulrey (2016b), the law 
specifically didn’t exclude prototyping.  
2. DARPA’s Interpretation of OT Authority 
In March 1992, Mr. Dunn, General Counsel for the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) crafted a memorandum for the Director of DARPA in 
preparation for the Director’s upcoming testimony in front of the Defense Industry and 
Technology Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. This memorandum 
provides insight into DARPA’s interpretation of OT authority at the time. In the 
memorandum, Mr. Dunn states “DARPA’s view of its authority to enter into 
nonprocurement agreements has been that it merely adds flexibility in the way we carry 
out our traditional mission. We utilize procurement contracts, grants, or other 
nonprocurement agreements in accordance with law as circumstances warrant” (Dunn, 
Agreements Authority and Key Defense Acquisition Strategies, 1992).   
3. Fiscal Year 1994:  DARPA Receives Specific OT for Prototypes 
Authority  
According to an interview with Mr. Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 
2016), in Fiscal Year 1994, due to the concern that the law didn’t specifically cover 
major or rapid prototyping, some felt the need for specific language to be crafted, 
enacted, and authorized in order for the government to legitimately use OT authority to 
branch out into major prototyping. Mr. Ulrey elaborated that Section 845 of Public Law 
103-160 gave “DARPA-specific OT authority for prototype development up to the point 
of production.” This was a temporary authority subject to a three year sunset provision 
(Ulrey, 2016).   
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4. Historical Changes to OT for Prototype Authority 
Over the past 20 years, the 845 OT for prototypes legislation has changed 
dramatically from its initial creation. The original 2371 language hasn’t changed much; 
therefore, the focus in this section will be on the changes to the 845 legislation, which 
have been succinctly summarized in Mr. Scott Ulrey’s presentation on “Other 
Transactions for Prototypes” given at the DARPA business conference. Following the 
issuance of OT authority for prototypes to DARPA in FY 1994, this same “authority was 
expanded to the military services and Secretary of Defense designated officials” and the 
“temporary authority was extended with another three year sunset provision” through 
execution of Section 804 of Public Law 104-201. In Section 241 of Public Law 105-261, 
Fiscal Year 1999 again saw the “temporary authority extended with a two year sunset 
provision.” In Fiscal Year 2000, Section 801 of Public Law 106-65 added a “Comptroller 
General Review” (Ulrey, 2016). 
a. Fiscal Year 2001:  Non-Traditional Defense Contractor 
In FY 2001, Sections 803 and 804 of Public Law 106-398 added “the concept of a 
‘non-traditional’ defense contractor.” If a company was a traditional defense contractor, 
then there would be a 1/3 cost share requirement. The FY 2001 changes enacted another 
extension of the temporary authority and included another three year sunset provision. In 
Section 822 of Public Law 107-107 for FY 2001, there was another interesting 
development in that the law “allowed for follow-on production contracts only for a 
specified number of units at a specific target price” (Ulrey, 2016). However, as will be 
reviewed in the next chapter, this particular legislation was not optimally thought out or 
crafted and was eventually changed with the 2016 NDAA.   
b. Fiscal Year 2004:  Expanding Definition of “Weapons System”   
In Fiscal Year 2004, Section 847 of Public Law 108-136 “expanded the definition of 
weapons system” and introduced a “pilot program to allow for follow-on contracting for 
the production of commercial items” (Ulrey, 2016). Once again, the temporary authority 
was extended, this time with a four year sunset provision.   
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c. Fiscal Years 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2013:  Sunset Extensions and 
Review Thresholds  
In FY 2006, Section 823 of Public Law 109-163 added “dollar-value threshold 
review levels” and made the “Procurement Integrity Act now applicable to OTs” (Ulrey, 
2016). In Section 824 of Public Law 110-417, FY 2009 “expanded the scope of the pilot 
program” and the “temporary authority was extended with a five year sunset provision.” 
In FY 2011, Section 826 of Public Law 111-383 included “all options in dollar-value 
threshold review levels.” In FY 2013, Section 863 of Public Law 112-239 again 
“extended the temporary authority and had another five year sunset provision” (Ulrey, 
2016).   
d. Fiscal Year 2015: Further Expansion of Definition of “Weapons or 
Weapons System” and Cost-Share Requirement 
In FY 2015, Section 812 of Public Law 113-291 enacted “Enhancing the mission 
effectiveness of military personnel” replacing the previous definition of “weapons or 
weapons systems used by the Armed Forces.” Further, now “small businesses were 
eligible to receive OT for prototype without cost-share requirement” (Ulrey, 2016). The 
FY2015 changes were significant and broadened the interpretation for what OT authority 
could be used for.   
e. Fiscal Year 2016:  OT for Prototypes Made Permanent  
Finally, as will be described in greater detail in the next chapter, the exciting new 
change came this Fiscal Year (2016) in Section 815 of Public Law 114-92 in which the 
temporary authority for OT for prototypes introduced in Section 845 was repealed. The 
law was rewritten, repackaged, made permanent, and is codified at 10 U.S.C. 2371b. 
And, the concept of “non-traditional defense contractor was redefined by 10 U.S.C. § 
2302(9)” (Ulrey, 2016).   
C. OTHER AGENCIES WITH OT AUTHORITY 
After DARPA received OT authority, other agencies soon followed suit. The CRS 
report titled “Other Transaction (OT) Authority” provides:  
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In chronological order, the agencies that have OT authority, and the 
Congress in which the applicable statute or statutes were enacted as 
follows:  85th Congress:  NASA; 101st Congress:  DOD (OT authority for 
science and technology); 103rd Congress:  DOD OT authority for 
prototypes; 104th Congress:  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); 
105th Congress:  Department of Transportation (DOT); 107th Congress:  
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS); 108th Congress:  Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and other 
agencies; and 109th Congress: Department of Energy (DOE). (Halchin, 
2011) 
1. Statutes Granting Agencies OT Authority 
Taken from GAO-16-209, Table 1 provides a listing of agencies and the 
respective statutes which grant the agencies OT authority. As you can see, there are 
currently eleven organizations that have the ability to use this unique authority.   
Table 1.   Agencies Authorized to Use Other Transaction Agreements and their 
Statutory Authorities. Source: GAO-16-209. 
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2. Agencies with OT Authority and OT Agreements Used 
Table 2 provides an at-a-glance view of what types of OT agreements each 
agency has entered into between Fiscal Years 2010 to 2014. Almost all agencies use OT 
authority to advance research. Both DOD and DHS have used OTs for RD&D and for 
prototypes. The FAA, NASA, and TSA have used OT arrangements for other than 
RD&D and prototypes.   
Table 2.   Agency Use of Other Transaction Agreements for Fiscal Years 2010 




3. Fiscal Year 2010 through 2014 Data on OTs 
GAO-16-209 also provides data on the number of active other transactions by 
agency from Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014. As evidenced in Table 3, NASA has the 
largest number of OT agreements during this time period, followed by DOD. This makes 
sense as NASA has had OT authority for the longest period of time.   
Table 3.   Number of Active Other Transaction Agreements by Agency, Fiscal 




In summary, this chapter reviewed the impact of the Space Agreement Act of 
1958 and how NASA’s original OT authority paved the way for other agencies to gain 
similar authority to carry out their missions. This chapter also discussed the market 
changes happening in the S&T community and how the innovation driving shift from 
government to the commercial sector provided an environment where the government 
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had to rethink how to engage non-traditional companies that possessed the capabilities 
that the government desired. This chapter also looked at the reasons why commercial 
firms were reluctant to engage with government R&D efforts as well as reviewed the 
acquisition reform efforts of the time. The environmental and market factors described in 
this chapter led to DOD receiving OT authority. This chapter detailed DOD’s OT 
authority and its subsequent changes and provided an overview of other agencies that 
have OT authority. The next chapter will focus specifically on the changes to OT for 
prototypes legislation implemented with the 2016 NDAA as well as examine applicable 
laws, socioeconomic, and legal considerations of OT agreements.   
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III. CURRENT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS 
This chapter focuses on the latest legislative changes for OT for prototype 
authority that were enacted with the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, 
examining what principles stayed the same and what were the major changes effected. 
This chapter also provides insight into what laws are applicable to OTs as well as reviews 
any socioeconomic or legal considerations.   
A. 2016 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 
Representative Mac Thornberry is the Chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC) and has been a staunch proponent of defense acquisition reform. In 
the article, “Thornberry’s Bill a Good Start on Acquisition Reform,” the author, Jason 
Tama (2015), states: 
One proposal on the innovation front is to make ‘Other Transaction’ (OT) 
authority permanent, and better use it to attract more agile companies to 
defense work. This authority allows streamlined business transactions 
unburdened by federal acquisition regulations, and has been used for 
decades by innovative organizations such as the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, or DARPA. By making it permanent, 
Thornberry hopes OT authority will be used more broadly across other 
programs. 
Representative Thornberry was successful in his attempts to make OT authority 
permanent. The 2016 NDAA was a major milestone for OT for prototype authority as the 
former Section 845 verbiage was repealed, repackaged, and rewritten and permanently 
codified at 10 U.S.C. 2371b. The following sections of this project will detail what has 
stayed the same and what is different.   
1. What is the Same? 
The 2016 NDAA didn’t entirely change all of the legislation with respect to OT 
for prototypes. There are several principles that have remained unchanged such as 
principles of competition, no requirement for justification for use of OTs, Comptroller 
General access, and application of the Procurement Integrity Act. At the DARPA 
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business conference, Mr. Scott Ulrey (2016b) did a fantastic job of explaining what has 
stayed the same in terms of OT for prototype legislation.   
a. Principle of Competition 
For example, even when using OT authority to enter into agreements, Contracting 
Officers are still encouraged to “use competitive procedures to the maximum extent 
practicable” (Ulrey, 2016). Fostering competition is a major tenet of federal acquisition 
and OT authority isn’t intended to circumvent the principle of competition. In fact, in an 
interview with Scott Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 2016), he stated that in 
his experience, most OTs are in fact, competed.   
b. Justification for Use of OT  
Another principle feature of the OT for prototype legislation that has remained 
unchanged is that the current language “allows the use of OT authority without having to 
justify why a procurement contract, grant, or cooperative agreement is not feasible or 
appropriate” (Ulrey, 2016). Of course, with OTs for R&D, when contemplating an OT 
agreement, a justification is still required which substantiates why a procurement 
contract, grant, or cooperative agreement would not be feasible.   
c. Comptroller General Access and Procurement Integrity Act 
Two other aspects of the legislation that did not change with the 2016 NDAA 
include the Comptroller General’s access and the application of the Procurement Integrity 
Act. Specifically, “Comptroller General’s access to information and review thresholds” 
remains unchanged. Also, while in general, FAR and DFARS clauses do not apply to OT 
agreements, the “Procurement Integrity Act applies” for OT for Prototype legislation 
(Ulrey, 2016). The Procurement Integrity Act does not apply to OTs for R&D.   
2. What is Different? 
The 2016 NDAA did introduce some changes with respect to the legislation for 
OT for prototypes. For instance, the definition of what is a non-traditional defense 
contractor changed significantly. Also, the new law that is codified in 10 U.S.C. 2371b 
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describes four circumstances which define those eligible to participate in an OT 
agreement. There are also changes in terms of requisite approval levels and the process 
for follow-on production. Overall, these changes represent a significant improvement in 
the legislation for OT for prototype authority, with the most important change being that 
that the authority is no longer temporary and is now permanent.   
a. What is a Non-Traditional Defense Contractor? 
The definition of what is a “non-traditional defense contractor” changed 
significantly with the 2016 NDAA. Previously, the definition contained in the notes of 
Section 845, 10 U.S.C. § 2371 defined a non-traditional defense contractor as: 
A business unit that has not, for a period of at least one (1) year prior to 
the date of OT, entered into or performed on: (1) Any contract that is 
subject to full coverage under Cost Accounting Standards (CAS); or (2) 
Any other contract in excess of certified cost or pricing data threshold to 
carry out prototype projects or to perform basic, applied, or advanced 
research projects for a Federal agency that is subject to the FAR. (Ulrey, 
2016) 
The previous definition “required submission of cost or pricing data for any contract over 
the threshold” (Ulrey, 2016). In contrast, the current legislation defines a non-traditional 
defense contractor as “An entity that is not currently performing or has not performed in 
the last one-year period on any contract for the DOD that is subject to full CAS 
coverage” (Ulrey, 2016). The major impact of this change is that this “broadens the pool 
of eligible-for OT recipients” (Ulrey, 2016). Further, instead of “any contract,” the 
definition has changed to “any contract for the DOD.” This also allows for the pool of 
eligible firms to be broadened; therefore, the resulting capabilities that are available to the 
government should be greater.  
b. Who Can Participate? 
In Scott Ulrey’s DARPA business conference presentation on “OT for 
Prototypes” he described the “four flavors” of eligibility of participants under 10 U.S.C. § 
2371b. The first circumstance is when there is “At least one non-traditional defense 
contractor participating to a significant extent” (Ulrey, 2016). During an interview with 
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Mr. Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 2016), he elaborated on his interpretation 
of what “significant extent” constituted. He explained that “Significant extent could mean 
a variety of things.... Even if the participation is small, if it contributes to the critical path 
of the program, it could be considered a significant extent.”  
The second circumstance is when “all significant participants in the transaction 
are small businesses or non-traditional defense contractors” (Ulrey, 2016). As Mr. Ulrey 
stated in his presentation, “This highlights congressional intent to reach out to startups, 
small businesses, and companies not currently contracting with the government” (Ulrey, 
2016).   
The third circumstance which determines who can participate is when “At least 1/
3 of the total cost of the prototype project is paid by the non-federal parties” (Ulrey, 
2016). This essentially means that, for traditional defense contractors, that they would 
have at least a 1/3 cost share. Cost-sharing will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
IV.   
Finally, if “the agency Senior Procurement Executive (SPE) determined 
exceptional circumstances justified use of the authority,” they could issue a waiver for a 
company to participate in an OT agreement (Ulrey, 2016).   
Mr. Ulrey’s presentation elaborated on DOD agencies that can participate in OT 
arrangements. He stated that “under the authority of 10 U.S.C § 2371b, DARPA, the 
military departments, and designees of the Secretary of Defense” could participate. 
Further, “pursuant to the Secretary of Defense’s designation memo dated March 3, 2016, 
two agencies have been designated:  the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)” (Ulrey, 2016).   
c. What are the Approval Levels? 
Mr. Ulrey also presented that the approval levels for OT for prototype agreements 
are significantly different under the 2016 NDAA. For example, CO approval was 
previously required on OT agreements under $20 million. The threshold for CO Approval 
has now increased from $20M to $50M. SPE approval used to be required for anything 
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from $20M - $100M; now, SPE approval is for any OT for prototype agreement valued 
from $50-$250 million. The Under Secretary of Defense (USD), Acquisition Technology 
and Logistics (AT&L) approval used to be at the greater than $100M level; now, the 
threshold for USD/AT&L approval is for anything greater than $250M. It is important to 
note that “SPE and USD (AT&L) approvals are not delegable” (Ulrey, 2016).   
d. What is the Process for Follow-On Actions? 
Finally, in terms of what is different, Mr. Ulrey explained at the DARPA business 
conference that the law concerning follow-on actions has changed dramatically. It used to 
be that there was a “pre-award determination requirement for agency to determine 
specific number of units at specific target prices that would be acquired at production 
stage” (Ulrey, 2016). Mr. Ulrey explained that it was “incredibly difficult to determine 
amounts” and that this “effectively did not allow follow-on actions” (Ulrey, 2016). Now, 
the current legislation “allows current agreement to be extended into production” (Ulrey, 
2016). Mr. Ulrey explained that sole source actions are allowed provided the initial 
agreement was awarded under competition and the participants successfully completed 
agreement (Ulrey, 2016). The changes surrounding follow-on actions makes it much 
easier to enter into the production phase.   
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF OT AGREEMENTS 
This section will provide an understanding of the applicable laws/clauses, 
socioeconomic considerations, and legal considerations with respect to OT agreements. 
Much of the knowledge in this section was gleaned from interviews with OT subject 
matter experts.   
1. Applicable Laws and Clauses 
In general, OT agreements are not subject to the traditional FAR and DFARS 
rules and regulations. However, while OTs are not mandated to use FAR and DFARS 
clauses, “one can certainly paraphrase from a FAR clause”(Ulrey, personal 
communications, May 23, 2016). In an interview with Mr. Ulrey (personal 
communications, May 23, 2016), he mentioned that many OT agreements have similar 
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clauses to those prescribed by the FAR, such as termination and disputes clauses. Mr. 
Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 2016) also mentioned that agreements 
generally include guidance on the management structure, scope of program and how to 
handle property and IP to include patents, data rights, and foreign access to technology. 
Agreements also provide information on how to manage funding issues and generally 
include a milestone schedule. Mr. Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 2016) also 
stated that OT agreements, in his experience, typically contain between ten and fifteen 
clauses, which is far less than that of a traditional procurement contract.   
With OTs, negotiation is heavily relied upon because there is no set template for 
OT agreements. Each OT agreement is unique and is truly a negotiation between both the 
government and the company. This is often referred to as “clean sheet contracting.” In an 
interview with Mr. Rick Dunn (personal communications, May 31, 2016), he stated that 
“Clean sheet paper contracting is hard.” While DARPA has a few sample agreements that 
serve as a starting point, Mr. Dunn (personal communications, May 31, 2016) mentioned 
that he fought against having a model but both industry and government wanted a model. 
Mr. Dunn (personal communications, May 31, 2016) stated that “Clauses should be 
secondary to meeting the objectives of the parties.”  
2. Socioeconomic Considerations 
a. Standard Laws and Small Business Set-Asides  
An interview with Diane Sidebottom (personal communications, May 23, 2016) 
revealed that the intent of R&D is to advance technology and innovation; therefore, 
socioeconomic considerations such as small business set-asides are not appropriate as it 
would limit the pool of capable firms. Mr. Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 
2016) concurred with this assertion and stated that “There are no target small business 
goals; rather, the goal is that the government wants to obtain the best technology and 
innovation from whomever possesses those capabilities.” In terms of other 
socioeconomic considerations, Ms. Diane Sidebottom (personal communications, May 
23, 2016) commented that the only socioeconomic policies that would apply would be 
“only to the extent that they are related to doing business in the United States, for 
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example, any civil rights, Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), or minimum wage 
laws.” In an interview with Mr. Dunn (personal communications, May 31, 2016), he 
remarked that “Title IV of the Civil Rights Act” would be applicable and also agreed that 
there are no set aside concerns with OTs.   
b. OTs and the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and the Small 
Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR) programs 
While OTs are not subject to small-business set-asides or target goals, OTs can be 
offered as an instrument option with other programs. According to the SBIR/STTR web 
portal: 
The SBIR and the STTR programs are highly competitive government-
funded contracts or grants that encourages domestic small businesses to 
engage in Federal Research/Research and Development (R/R&D) that has 
the potential for commercialization. The recipient projects must have the 
potential for commercialization and must meet specific U.S. Government 
R&D needs. These needs are advertised during three solicitations each 
year. You must be a small business that meets certain qualifications in 
order to be eligible for this program. (Frequently Asked Questions, 2016)   
In an interview with Mr. Scott Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 2016), 
the question of use of OTs in these programs revealed that, to his knowledge “DARPA 
has not used OTs with the STTR program but OTs have been used in the SBIR program.” 
Mr. Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 2016) further stated that “Under SBIRs, 
the company is required to deliver a prototype and a small business does not have a cost 
share requirement.” Essentially, OTs are another instrument to accomplish the 
government’s mission when a traditional procurement contract or grant is not conducive 
to working with commercial companies. Mr. Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 
2016) stated that he “offers up OTs as an alternative to contracts or grants when a 
company may not have an accounting system and is a commercial versus a traditional 
defense contractor.” In other words, he uses OTs when “companies are commercially 
focused small businesses” (personal communications, May 23, 2016). Mr. Ulrey 
(personal communications, May 23, 2016) further explained that OTs are used 
infrequently, perhaps about “five times per year” and he strives for a “30 day 
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turnaround.” In the case of SBIRs, OTs are appealing to small businesses for all the same 
reasons as detailed in Chapter IV.   
3. Legal Considerations 
Part of the interviews included questions on potential legal implications with the 
use of OTs and whether or not OT agreements are subject to the same bid protest 
regulations as that of the traditional procurement contract. According to an article in The 
Procurement Lawyer, the authors describe CICA and OTs in relation to the CICA statute: 
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), revised the FAR to 
increase competition for the award of procurement contracts and to allow 
for protests of those awards. The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) derives its authority to review awards and solicitations of contracts 
from CICA. One of the most attractive features of the GAO as a protest 
forum is the automatic stay provision that usually results from a timely 
protest. By contrast, one of the more useful characteristics of an OT 
agreement is that the award of these agreements generally is not subject to 
GAO review. (Cassidy, Plitsch, & Barclay, 2013) 
During an interview with Ms. Diane Sidebottom (personal communications, May 
23, 2016), she also concurred that OTs are not protestable as they are not subject to 
CICA. However, firms can certainly lodge their complaints. Ms. Sidebottom (personal 
communications, May 23, 2016) has acknowledged that there have been some complaints 
but that the government is overall very open and transparent in these situations.   
During an interview with Mr. Scott Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 
2016), he also mentioned that firms can submit a challenge, but that he was not aware of 
any issues arising from DARPA issued OTs. Mr. Ulrey (personal communications, May 
23, 2016) mentioned that he “has processed over 500 OT agreements himself and that 
DARPA has issued over 1000+ program solicitations with no legal issues.”  
C. SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter focused on the specific changes effected from the 2016 
NDAA on OT for prototype authority. The chapter reviewed what principles remained 
the same and what was different. Of course, the major change was that the OT for 
prototype authority was made permanent. Other changes included a re-definition of what 
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constituted a non-traditional defense contractor as well as changes in approval levels, 
requirements for participation, and requirements for follow-on production actions. This 
chapter concluded by describing OT agreements in terms of applicable laws and clauses, 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This chapter provides an analysis of OT authority using the TIPS© analytical 
framework authored by Professor E. Cory Yoder at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS). This chapter also examines the advantages/benefits of OT authority as well as 
reviews potential disadvantages/risks of using this authority. Finally, this chapter takes a 
look at sample programs created through use of OT agreements and discusses the impact 
OT authority has had in various fields of study.   
A. THREE INTEGRATIVE PILLARS OF SUCCESS (TIPS)© ANALYTICAL 
MODEL 
As stated in E. Cory Yoder’s 2016 MN 4371 presentation slides titled 
“Performance Metrics – Analytical Frameworks for Policy and Process Getting the Most 
from Contracting,” the TIPS© analytical model is an “assessment and management tool 
for operational success developed by Cory Yoder for planning and executing contingency 
contracting operations.” This model has been revised multiple times (2010, 2012 and 
2013). Yoder presents a framework in which the main premise is that a successful 
organization is dependent upon the balance of the three pillars of personnel, platforms, 
and protocols combined with a strong foundation in authorization and appropriation. 
Essentially, all pillars must be examined to ensure that they are working together in 
harmony. For example, without the funds and authorization to carry out their mission, an 
organization cannot proceed or be successful. Also, if an organization has the right mix of 
people with the correct skillsets yet the platforms or the protocols are not in harmony, 
then the organization is not operating at its fullest potential. Figure 2 provides a visual of 




Figure 2.  TIPSAnalytical Framework. Source: MN 4371 Presentation Slides 
(2016)  
1. Authorization and Appropriation 
The foundation of the TIPS© model is authorization and appropriation. The three 
pillars of personnel, platforms, and protocols require appropriate authorization and 
appropriation because the mission cannot get accomplished without the funds to recruit 
the right people, create sound platforms, or establish protocols. With respect to OT 
authority, the original 2371 authority as well as the recently permanent authority codified 
under 10 U.S.C. 2371b for OT for prototypes provides this authorization from Congress. 
Under this authority, monies can then be appropriated and OT authority can be used to 
carry out the mission.  USD/AT&L Frank Kendall (2016) stated in “Our Theme in 2016 – 
Sustaining Momentum” that “This year’s budget includes a number of advanced 
technology demonstrators and experimental prototypes and we need to get these 
provisions enacted and the projects started.” 
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Figure 3 provides an image which illustrates that authorization and appropriation 
represent the foundation of the three pillars. Without a strong foundation, the other pillars 
could not stand on their own.   
 
Figure 3.  TIPS© Authorization and Appropriation. Adapted from MN 4371 
Presentation Slides (2016). 
2. Personnel 
The first pillar in the TIPS© model represents personnel as illustrated in Figure 4. 
Under this pillar, it is critical to understand if an organization has the combination of the 
right people with the right skill set in the right positions. Yoder (2016) explains that there 
is a “Critical link between personnel, rank, positon, credential and capability. He also 
explains that this pillar “includes not only the Contracting Officer (CO) but all personnel 
and stakeholders in the system.” In light of the personnel pillar, research has revealed 
several challenges in this area to include lack of OT subject matter experts,  lack of 
qualified OT trainers, and culture shock from stakeholders.   
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a. Few Subject Matter Experts 
The first challenge under the personnel pillar is that there are very few subject 
matter experts in the acquisition field who truly understand what OT authority is, can 
convey the intent behind OT creation, and who understand the impact OT authority has 
on the DOD mission. I was fortunate enough to be able to glean information about OTs 
from Mr. Richard Dunn, who was an integral part of getting both the DOD and DARPA 
OT authority during his tenure as General Counsel (GC) at DARPA. Mr. Scott Ulrey and 
Ms. Diane Sidebottom (a government contractor) are the resident OT experts at DARPA 
who have been tremendous advocates and supporters of this authority; they, too, were 
able to provide tremendous insight about OTs. Other military departments and DOD 
agencies such as MDA and DTRA also use this authority but it is unclear the depth of 
bench strength of personnel at those institutions who actually are knowledgeable about 
OT authority.   
Further, since OT agreements are essentially unique arrangements that vary 
depending upon each specific circumstance, this requires highly motivated acquisition 
professionals that are able to ask the critical questions and that can excel in negotiating 
OT agreements. As stated by ranking member McCaul at the “Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology of the 
Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives One Hundred Tenth 
Congress Second Session”:   
It is my understanding that the Department only allows its most 
experienced and highly trained contracting officers to enter into other 
transactions and even competes such contracts despite there being no 
requirement that it do so. I believe that this shows that the Department 
approaches the negotiations of other transactions with the appropriate 
gravity, and I look forward to hearing how the Department has put forth 
this authority to use and the technologies that it has developed as a result 
of these agreements. (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008) 
It is critical that DOD expand the depth and breadth of acquisition professionals in order 
to empower these individuals to possess the critical skillsets necessary to create effective 
and sound OT agreements. These professionals will have to be well educated in areas 
such as negotiation, intellectual property, patents, and data rights.   
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b. Lack of Trainers and Adequate Training Materials 
The second challenge with respect to the personnel pillar has to do with training. 
Research has revealed that as there are very few subject matter experts, there are also 
consequently, very few qualified OT trainers and there is also little training available in 
this area of contracting. Unless an organization is geared towards R&D contracting, it is 
very possible that someone in the acquisition field would never become familiar with this 
acquisition instrument/authority. According to the Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU) Acquisition Training Application System (ACQTAS) website, there is a 
continuous learning course (CLC) 035 available titled “Other Transactions for Prototype 
Projects”; however, that DAU course needs to be refreshed to reflect the latest changes in 
legislation. Through interviews with Mr. Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 
2016), Mr. Dunn (personal communications, May 31, 2016), and Ms. Sidebottom 
(personal communications, May 23, 2016), it was revealed that they all concur that the 
DAU training is in need of an update. Mr. Ulrey, Mr. Dunn, and Ms. Sidebottom have all 
provided training on OT authority; however, there may come a point in time when they 
have retired; therefore, it is imperative that the DOD understand that there is a lack of 
qualified trainers in this acquisition area.   
c. Stakeholder Culture Shock 
Lastly and perhaps the most difficult challenge of all with respect to personnel has 
to do with the culture shock experienced by all stakeholders. It is safe to state that OT 
agreements represent an extreme departure from traditional acquisition methods. As 
stated earlier, OT agreements are not subject to traditional FAR and DFARS clauses and 
there is no singular template of how to create an OT agreement; therefore, OT authority 
and OT agreements represent an anomaly, an unknown, to many in the acquisition career 
field.  Ms. Sidebottom (personal communications, May 23, 2016) revealed that it was her 
experience that some COs perceived an increased likelihood of an audit threat by using 
OT authority. In addition to COs being uncomfortable, other stakeholders such as 
technical experts and Congress are also wary of using OT authority. This is 
understandable since OT agreements are relatively new among the cadre of acquisition 
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tools and it is more comfortable to continue with known arrangements such as the 
traditional procurement contract, grant, or cooperative agreement. Program Managers 
may be unaware of the availability of OT agreements as an option. Congress has a 
responsibility to ensure that taxpayer dollars are being spent prudently; therefore, it is 
understandable that OT authority, which is absent of traditional safeguards, would be 
considered risky. In the following quote, taken from “The Final Report of the Integrated 
Product Team (IPT) on The Services’ Use of 10 U.S.C. 2371 ‘Other Transactions’ and 
845 Prototype Authorities,” an example is provided which demonstrates the uneasiness of 
the Services’ in adopting OT authority: 
The Services have not used ‘other transactions’ for research due to 10 
U.S.C. 2371’s conditions that ‘other transactions’ can only be used when a 
standard contract, grant, or cooperative agreement is not feasible or 
appropriate. To support their research needs for dual-use projects 
involving commercial firms, the Services have issued ‘flexible’ 
cooperative agreements. As such, the Services’ have viewed ‘other 
transactions’ for research as an instrument of last resort. (Department of 
Defense, 1996) 
 
Figure 4.  TIPS© Personnel. Adapted from MN 4371 Presentation Slides (2016). 
Instead of COs, program managers, the Services’, and Congress viewing OT as a 
“last resort,” it is critical that the DOD begin to change culture by promoting a greater 
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understanding of OT authority and its important place in the contracting tool box in 
meeting the DOD’s mission.   
3. Platforms 
The second pillar in the TIPS© model represents platforms as illustrated in Figure 
5. Under this pillar, as stated by Yoder (2016), it is critical to understand if an 
organization has the “hardware and tangible software systems that provide for analysis, 
decision-making, production, management and communication.” Further, this pillar 
examines “quality and quantity mix and appropriateness for the most efficient 
organization (MEO) mission.” Again, the platform pillar must work in harmony with 
personnel and protocols—it cannot stand alone. Two challenges from a platform 
perspective are that there is no automated system for creating OTs and there is not a 
dedicated platform to advertising OTs. 
a. Clean-Sheet Contracting - No Dedicated OT Writing System 
Traditional procurement contracts are generated by automated systems. To name 
a few examples, federal and civilian agencies use contract writing systems such as the 
Standard Procurement System (SPS) Procurement Desktop 2 (PD2) developed by CACI, 
Inc.; PRISM contract writing system developed by Compusearch; and the Momentum 
contract writing system developed by CGI. In contrast, research has indicated that there is 
no dedicated platform or agreement writing system with respect to OTs. OT agreements 
are generally crafted on word documents and uploaded into the organization’s cognizant 
contract writing system. Therefore, there is currently no standard e-commerce way of 
creating these agreements and there is no standard hardware or software to assist in 
creating agreements or program solicitations. According to Mr. Ulrey, this way of 
creating an OT agreement has been referred to as “clean sheet contracting” (personal 
communications, May 23, 2016).   
b. No Advertising Platform 
A second challenge with respect to OTs and platforms is that a platform currently 
doesn’t exist solely for advertising OTs. DARPA offers OTs in addition to the traditional 
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procurement contract, grant, and cooperative agreement and advertises their R&D 
opportunities through Broad Agency Announcements (BAA’s) and/or program 
solicitations that are often posted on the Federal Business Opportunities (FBO) website 
but Mr. Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 2016) astutely points out that non-
traditional companies that are commercially focused often are not familiar with and do 
not search the FBO website for those opportunities. In fact, both Mr. Ulrey (personal 
communications, May 23, 2016) and Ms. Sidebottom (personal communications, May 
23, 2016) concurred that advertising has been the biggest challenge with respect to OTs 
in terms of attracting firms that are unfamiliar with doing business with the government.   
 
Figure 5.  TIPS© Platforms. Adapted from MN 4371 Presentation Slides (2016). 
4. Protocols 
The third pillar in the TIPS© model represents protocols as illustrated in Figure 6. 
Under this pillar, Yoder (2016) states that it is critical to understand if an organization has 
the “the rules, decision making framework, policies, and business models necessary to 
achieve the desired end-state (ideal customer support/constraints).” Further, according to 
Yoder (2016), this pillar examines “quality and quantity mix and appropriateness for the 
most efficient organization (MEO) mission.” Again, the protocol pillar must work in 
harmony with personnel and platforms—it also cannot stand alone. With respect to OT 
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authority and the protocols pillar, while research has revealed that there is no definitive 
singular guidance on how to create OT agreements, it is a positive step that Congress has 
made the authority permanent.   
a. Lack of Singular Guidance 
In terms of protocols for OTs, one research finding is that there is no step-by-step 
guide to creating OT agreements because each OT agreement is unique and tailored to 
meet the specific mission needs of the parties involved. The USD/AT&L issued an 
“Other Transactions Guide for Prototype Projects” dated August 2002; however, it is 
severely outdated. While the guide provides useful information with respect to the OT for 
prototype authority, protocols haven’t been mapped out. One cannot refer to the guide for 
a step-by-step manual on how to create an OT agreement. Due to the unique nature of 
OTs, it is understandable that protocols have been difficult to standardize. According to 
Mr. Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 2016), DARPA has been creating and 
collecting various samples of program solicitations for OT agreements, depending on the 
type of arrangement; however, these are meant to be a starting off point rather than a 
definitive template or one-size fits all solution.   
b. Permanency of OT Authority 
In terms of protocols, another positive is that OT authority for prototypes is now 
permanent. As illustrated in Chapter II, after a series of sunset extensions, the original 
845 language has been repackaged and now made permanent. In discussions with Mr. 
Dunn (personal communications, May 31, 2016), he added that the permanency of this 




Figure 6.  TIPS© Protocols. Adapted from MN 4371 Presentation Slides (2016). 
B. ADVANTAGES AND BENEFITS 
This section will analyze the advantages or benefits espoused by advocates of OT 
authority. Several benefits of OTs include flexible terms and conditions, attracting non-
traditional commercial companies, cost-sharing, reducing risks and uncertainties, and 
fostering innovative business relationships.   
1. Flexible Terms and Conditions 
Research has revealed that many sources cite flexibility as the biggest advantage 
to using OT agreements. As stated in Chapter II, there are those companies that are wary 
of doing business with the government because the numerous FAR and DFARS clauses 
associated with traditional procurement contracts are daunting. In contrast, as stated in a 
GAO report titled “DOD Research:  Acquiring Research by Nontraditional Means”: 
Cooperative agreements and other transactions appear to have provided 
DOD a tool to leverage the private sector’s technological know-how and 
financial investment. The instruments have attracted firms that 
traditionally did not perform research for DOD by enabling more flexible 
terms and conditions than the standard financial management and 
intellectual property provisions typically found in DOD contracts and 
grants. Thus, the instruments have contributed to reducing some of the 
barriers between the defense and civilian industrial bases. (United States 
General Accounting Office, 1996) 
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The notion of flexibility is also mentioned by the authors of “Another Option in a 
Tightening Budget: A Primer on Department of Defense ‘Other Transactions’ 
Agreements” who state that “One of the primary advantages of OT agreements is that 
they are not subject to the FAR or many procurement statutes that govern traditional 
federal procurements” (Cassidy, Plitsch, & Barclay, 2013).   
Another source also commented on flexibility with respect to audit requirements. 
According to the “Final Report of the Integrated Product Team on The Services’ Use of 
10 U.S.C. 2371 ‘Other Transactions’ and 845 Prototype Authorities”: 
DARPA’s section 845 “other transactions” for acquisition of prototypes 
employ commercial practices, and typically do not involve traditional, 
Government-unique requirements for audit. Instead, they rely on the 
contractor and independent auditors for certifications and maximize the 
use of existing contractor standard accounting systems/practices and 
property management systems. (Department of Defense, 1996) 
Chapter II also discussed flexibilities with respect to intellectual property provisions. This 
has been touted as an advantage because commercial firms were hesitant to work with the 
government under FAR and DFARS clauses as well as provisions of the Bayh- Dole Act 
that tended to favor the government with respect to intellectual property rights. Under an 
OT agreement, there is flexibility because intellectual property is an area that can be 
discussed and negotiated between the parties so that the final agreement results in a 
mutually beneficial arrangement.   
2. Attract Non-traditionals 
Another benefit of OT authority is that it has attracted “non-traditional” 
companies that either had not or did not want to do business with the government. As 
described in Chapter II, a shift occurred within the S&T community in that instead of the 
government being the driver of innovation, commercial industry was now the driver of 
innovation. With that said, the appeal of OTs finally enabled the DOD to attract these 
non-traditional firms that previously were not keen on doing business with the 
government. A GAO study titled “DOD Research:  Acquiring Research by Nontraditional 
Means” provided metrics that bolstered these claims and stated that  “…we estimate that 
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about 42 percent of the 275 commercial firms that participated in 1 or more agreements 
were firms that traditionally had not performed research for DOD” (United States 
General Accounting Office, 1996).   
In March 1992, Mr. Richard Dunn, General Counsel for the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) crafted a memorandum for the Director of DARPA 
as preparation for the Director’s upcoming testimony in front of the Defense Industry and 
Technology Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In the 
memorandum, Mr. Dunn provides an example of how DARPA was able to attract a non-
traditional firm, stating: 
A recent example involves high performance computing. DARPA issued a 
broad agency announcement. Dozens of proposals were submitted by large 
businesses, small businesses, universities and non-profits. After evaluation 
21 awards were made. These included 18 procurement contracts, two 
agreements, and one grant. The significance of the agreements was that 
they were with industry leaders Intel Corp. and Cray Research, Inc., 
respectively. The agreement with Cray is especially significant because, 
though Cray is a leading supplier of supercomputers to the government as 
well as others, it has never previously participated in a government R&D 
program. In this case, we were able to effectuate the policy of FAR 35.002 
by encouraging the ‘best sources from the scientific and industrial 
community to become involved…’ at the same time as we honored FAR 
35.003 by utilizing a nonprocurement agreement in a ‘stimulate or 
support’ situation. (Dunn, Agreements Authority and Key Defense 
Acquisition Strategies, 1992) 
A GAO report also provided another example of how an OT agreement attracted a 
major commercial firm that previously refused to do business with the government. The 
GAO report stated:   
A 1994 other transaction with a Hewlett-Packard led consortium provides 
insights into how the authority was used to negotiate terms and conditions 
affecting both the financial management and intellectual property matters 
that are atypical of contracts, grants, or standard cooperative agreements. 
We had previously reported that Hewlett-Packard declined to accept 
government research and development funds to protect its technical data 
rights. In this case however, Hewlett-Packard responded to a DARPA 
announcement soliciting proposals to advance the state of the art in the 
manufacture of more affordable optoelectronics systems and components. 
According to DARPA, this technology will enable data transmissions at 
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high rates from high performance parallel processors at far lower costs 
than current technology allows. (United States General Accounting Office, 
1996) 
Interviews with Mr. Dunn (personal communications, May 31, 2016), Ms. 
Sidebottom (personal communications, May 23, 2016) , and Mr. Ulrey (personal 
communications, May 23, 2016) revealed that not only did OT authority attract “non-
traditional” companies but it also attracted different segments of companies that 
previously had done business with the government. When asked what firms this authority 
attracted, Mr. Ulrey identified the following firms (although it was mentioned that there 
were many others):  “Intel, Hewlett Packard, Motorola, commercial divisions of IBM, 
Agilent Technologies, Micron, Silicon Graphics, 3M, Novartis, Sanofi, Pfizer, and 
Medimmune” (personal communications, May 23, 2016).   
The RAND study bolstered this idea that OT authority attracted different 
segments of traditional firms stating: 
At the beginning of this study we spent a lot of time trying to find 
evidence that new companies had entered the ranks of DOD suppliers. We 
found a few. But we finally realized that a major part of the new activity 
comes from segments of large firms where the firm is a traditional 
supplier:  names like 3M, Lucent, Motorola, Eastman Kodak, Oracle, and 
others. But major segments of those firms, using corporate funds to 
develop products for the commercial market, had previously been 
unwilling to work for DOD under the traditional contracting process. Now 
those broader segments of the firms are willing to work for DOD under an 
OT agreement. At Motorola – to cite one specific example that was quoted 
to us – one group containing about 200 engineers works for DOD under a 
FAR-type contract, but under an OT agreement it has access to the entire 
corporate development staff. The key difference is that, under an OT 
agreement, those firms can protect their intellectual property. (Smith, 
Drezner, & Lachow, n.d.) 
3. Cost-Sharing 
Research has also revealed that another benefit of OT authority is that it brings 
about the concept of cost-sharing. As will be discussed in the next section, cost-sharing is 
a divisive topic and was also viewed by some as a potential negative. However, according 
to the GAO report titled “DOD Research:  Acquiring Research by Nontraditional 
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Means,” metrics indicated that “By sharing the costs of projects, DOD has partially offset 
its own costs while generally enabling recipients to expand the scope of the projects 
undertaken. In the 72 projects we reviewed, recipients planned to contribute about $1.39 
in cash or in-kind contributions for each dollar provided by DOD” (United States General 
Accounting Office, 1996). Whenever industry and the government are invested together 
in a project, there is more of a collaborative spirit and both parties are vested in working 
towards a good outcome.   
4. Better Manage Risk and Uncertainties 
Another benefit of OT arrangements is that they allow the government to better 
manage risks and uncertainties due to the collaborative nature between government 
personnel and industry as opposed to the traditional “us versus them” mentality 
sometimes experienced when working under the terms of a traditional procurement 
contract. As found through the RAND study titled “Assessing the Use of ‘Other 
Transactions’ Authority for Prototype Projects”: 
Another major benefit of the OT process is the improved ability to manage 
the risks and uncertainties that are inherent in any development project. 
OT agreements typically contain a clause stating that at any time progress 
or results indicate that a change would be beneficial to project objectives, 
such a change can be made through mutual agreement of DOD and 
industry managers. As long as the change does not affect the stated 
program goals, or the total cost, those changes do not require external 
review and can become effective immediately upon agreement, with 
minimal documentation internal to the project. Such flexibility provides 
powerful opportunities to better cope with the problems and opportunities 
that occur when developing new systems and components. (Smith, 
Drezner, & Lachow, n.d.) 
The RAND study also pointed out that “The authority to change also extends to 
the premature termination of a project if all parties agree. In one of the projects we 
studied, the project was terminated at the halfway point because progress was 
unsatisfactory and effective corrective action seemed unlikely” (Smith, Drezner, & 
Lachow, n.d.). The ability to quickly terminate is in sharp contrast with termination 
clauses of the traditional procurement contract, grant, or cooperative agreement, under 
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which the government generally is not able to act as quickly as they would under an OT 
agreement. 
  With R&D, when government and industry are working together to advance state-
of-the-art technology and innovation that has yet to be seen or developed, it is critical for 
either party to be able to most efficiently manage risks and uncertainties. Therefore, the 
ability to either make changes and/or end a relationship quickly is an attractive feature of 
OTs.   
5. Innovative Business Relationships 
Another benefit of OT authority is that the nature of OT agreements fosters 
innovative business relationships. RADM Coetzee (2015) states that “When selectively 
used, this authority can engage nontraditional firms by allowing innovative business 
arrangements or structures that otherwise would not be feasible or appropriate using 
standard acquisition instruments.” The RAND study provided the following specific 
example of how an OT agreement resulted in an innovative business relationship, stating: 
In several instances, the initial solicitation yielded proposals showing that 
a partnership of two or more firms would likely yield a better product. The 
DOD managers could negotiate with the firms and solicit a new proposal 
from such a partnership without the lengthy process of preparing and 
advertising a new solicitation. Sometimes an industry partnership is more 
easily formed through informal consortia, with one firm being the 
contracting agent. An OT agreement offers opportunities for such 
arrangements that would be prohibited under standard contracting rules. 
(Smith, Drezner, & Lachow, n.d.) 
There are numerous examples of how OT agreements have resulted in innovative 
business relationships, but the main takeaway is that this wouldn’t happen under a 
traditional procurement contract necessarily. It is only due to the unique nature of OTs 
that provide this added benefit of having the ability for industry to enter into different 
business arrangements in order to provide the best capabilities to the government.   
C. DISADVANTAGES/RISKS 
Although the overall tone of the research materials indicated that there were many 
advantages provided by OT authority, there are those who have expressed concern with 
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OT authority in the sense that some feel there are a lack of safeguards, the purported 
benefits are difficult to quantify, and that cost sharing limits the pool of available R&D 
contractors. Senator John McCain and Ms. Danielle Brian of the Project on Government 
Oversight (POGO) have been the most notable opponents to OT authority.   
1. Lack of Safeguards 
Research revealed that the biggest concern with respect to OT authority is a 
perceived lack of safeguards to protect government interests. Acquisition professionals 
have been trained to become well versed in the provisions, clauses, rules, regulations, and 
procedures as outlined in the FAR and DFARS. OTs are not subject to the same rules and 
regulations provided by the FAR and DFARS; therefore, there is a concern that there is 
potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. For example, L. Elaine Halchin, Analyst, American 
National Government, for the CRS, stated in testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology that: 
Also, the protection and tools that contracting officers have to negotiate 
fair and reasonable prices and to ensure that costs are allowable and 
consistent with Federal procurement policies do not apply to other 
transactions. Additionally, the DOD inspector general has reported that 
some contracting officers fail to sufficiently document the justification for 
using research OTs, to document the review of cost proposals and to 
monitor actual research costs. Thus, the flexibility inherent in OT 
authority, which is a significant advantage of using this method, might 
also result in fewer protections and decreased transparency and 
accountability when compared to conventional procurement methods. 
(U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008) 
Another example is provided by written testimony by POGO as follows: 
POGO is concerned that both the missile defense and FCS programs are 
ripe for abuse and the use of OTA truly eliminates protections of hundreds 
of billions of taxpayer dollars. The OTA mechanism waives many of the 
financial oversight requirements of typical contracts for goods or services 
with the aim of attracting so-called non-traditional” defense contractors. 
“Other transactions” allow contractors to avoid taxpayer protections and 
transparency requirements in the contract statutes and regulations, which 
provide protections to ensure fair and reasonable procurement prices. 
OTA, however, is exempt from those protections and can exempt a 
defense contractor from undergoing government audits or providing the 
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federal contracting agency and government auditors with access to the 
contractor’s pertinent records. (Brian, 2005) 
Senator John McCain made the following remarks during testimony before the Airland 
Subcommittee. As Chair of the Subcommittee on Airland, he made the following opening 
statement, echoing the concerns of Ms. Halchin and the POGO: 
Future Combat System (FCS) is of particular concern to me, especially the 
use of Other Transaction Authority (OTA) as the contracting 
vehicle…Since the 1994 Act, DOD officials and industry have repeatedly 
requested that we extend ‘Other Transaction Authority’ to production 
contracts. Congress has consistently refused to do so, because we have 
taken the view that with hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars at 
stake, the taxpayer needs the protections built into the traditional 
procurement system. While we recognize that there may be need to 
continue doing business with non-traditional contractors in the production 
phase of a program, we have preferred to address this issue through 
targeted waivers that are limited to those companies who need them. Now, 
the Army has put forward a program that uses ‘Other Transaction 
Authority’ for a $20 billion contract, a figure much greater than the 
Congress intended and unprecedented. We look forward to your testimony 
and the testimony of the witnesses on the second panel regarding the 
appropriateness of using ‘Other Transaction Authority’ for a contract this 
size and whether the Army has included clauses that protect the 
Government’s interest. (McCain, 2005) 
Similarly, as stated in the “Written Testimony of POGO’s Danielle Brian on DOD’s Use 
of ‘Commercial Acquisition’ and ‘Other Transaction Authority’ before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Airland Subcommittee”:   
With regard to OTA, POGO concludes that their creation was based on a 
fallacy. Congress was lead to believe that hordes of ‘non-traditional’ 
contractors who were afraid of government red-tape were clamoring to 
bring the government innovative good or services. OTA was created to 
welcome these new businesses into the government contracting fold. Well, 
the hordes never came. Instead, we are left with a system without 
contracting controls, and billions of dollars being awarded to “traditional” 
contractors who were already selling goods or services to the government. 
Although government statistics show that a few ‘non-traditional’ 
contractors have stepped forward, those same reviews indicate that as 
much as 97% of OTA funds are going to traditional contractors. (Brian, 
2005) 
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While there is a perception of a lack of traditional safeguards, each OT agreement does 
contain clauses as described in Section III of this research project. The key difference is 
that instead of abiding by a clause matrix guided by contract type, each OT agreement is 
unique in the sense that there is a true negotiation on the clauses and provisions to be 
included. Government and industry work together to carefully craft each agreement so 
that it is mutually beneficial for the partnership and that it is an effective agreement 
which advances the mission needs and program objectives. And, while the FAR and 
DFARS clauses are not mandatory, this does not preclude a CO from crafting a clause 
that is similar in spirit to FAR and DFARS clauses.   
2. Lack of Metrics 
Another area of concern with OT authority is that there are not concrete metrics 
that are available to measure success. Congress and COs are charged with being 
responsible stewards of the taxpayer dollar. Congress regularly authorizes and 
appropriates monies towards programs and needs to be able to collect data on how well 
taxpayer dollars were spent. With traditional procurement contracts, especially with 
known requirements and firm, fixed price scenarios, the government is able to know what 
something “should cost” and data on savings achieved through negotiations or 
competitive source selections is readily available. On the other hand, with R&D efforts, 
when the government is developing something that has never been developed before, 
capturing a “should cost” is virtually unachievable. Consequently, many R&D efforts are 
cost-reimbursement efforts and capturing metrics like savings is difficult, if not, 
impossible.   
To answer DOD’s question on what benefits could be quantified with OT’s, a 
report published by the RAND Corporation conducted a thorough study of OTs and 
stated that their “strategy was to examine a sample of 21 projects in some detail, nearly 
one-third of the 72 prototype programs started during the 1994–1998 time period” 
(Smith, Drezner, & Lachow, n.d.). The RAND study concluded that: 
One important element of our research was to develop a set of metrics that 
would measure the relative effects of OT on program outcomes and OTs 
broader policy goals. While attempting to accomplish this, we were unable 
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to develop any practical quantifiable metrics that others would find 
credible. The few quantifiable metrics we uncovered are either misleading 
(e.g., the number of nontraditional contractors) or unverifiable (e.g., cost 
avoidance). This result affects both the kind of information we can present 
and the kind of conclusions that can be drawn….It is not practical to 
compare a single OT program with a counterpart conducted under 
traditional contracting methods because we never have an analog program 
that is remotely comparable. (Smith, Drezner, & Lachow, n.d.) 
Research has revealed that capturing metrics continues to be a challenge. As 
described in the next chapter, this will be an area of opportunity going forward.   
3. Cost-Sharing 
Another risk identified was that of cost-sharing. While advocates tout cost-sharing 
as an advantage provided by OT agreements, Mr. Dunn (personal communications, May 
31, 2016) suggests that cost-sharing causes the pool of contractors that respond to R&D 
opportunities to shrink as traditional defense contractors are disincentivized to 
participate. And, opponents to the cost-sharing provisions indicate that this isn’t 
acceptable because R&D efforts require the best and brightest to participate.   
 According to a DOD Audit Report titled “Cost Charged to Other Transactions,” 
“Issues were identified with $83.4 million (27 percent) of the $304.3 million contractor 
cost share for research other transactions” (Office of the Inspector General, Department 
of Defense, 1999). Another IG report found that “Administration for ‘other transactions’ 
for research and prototypes was improving and generally adequate for 77 ‘other 
transactions’ reviewed…However, the Army, the Air Force, and the Defense Contract 
Management Command needed to improve their management controls…” (Office of the 
Inspector General, Department of Defense, 1998). Finally, in DOD IG Report 97–114, 
there was a recommendation that “the Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
issue policy guidance to improve the use of other transactions and to ensure DOD cost 
share does not exceed the statutory limit” (Office of the Inspector General, Department of 
Defense, 1997).   
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Cost-sharing was not a requirement with the original OT authority; however, in an 
effort to truly incentivize government dollars going to “non-traditional” companies, the 
cost-sharing requirement was introduced. This will continue to be an area of discussion.   
D. OT APPLICATION IN CURRENT INDUSTRIES/IMPACT 
Throughout the years, numerous OT agreements have been crafted within the 
DOD. This section provides a couple examples of how OT agreements are contributing to 
advancing state-of-the-art technology in support of the warfighter. Two examples are 
from the U.S. Army and one example is provided from DARPA.   
In 2000, a DOD notice advertised that “The Army announced the Joint Tactical 
Radio System (JTRS) Joint Program Office, with contract support from U.S. Army 
Communication Electronics Command (CECOM), recently signed an “Other 
Transaction” Agreement with BAE Systems Aerospace Inc.” and further provided details 
that:   
BAE SYSTEMS will perform a research, development, and production 
effort to assist in validating the emerging open standard Software 
Communications Architecture (SCA) being developed as part of the JTRS 
Step 2A activities….The JTRS is an enabler of the doctrine of information 
superiority, as it must be supported on the battlefield. The SCA is a 
specified set of rules, methods, and design criteria for implementing 
software reprogrammable digital radios. The SCA will become the basis 
for all future DOD tactical radio acquisitions. While this effort is being 
sponsored by DOD, it is expected the SCA will become an industry 
accepted standard for both commercial and military radios. (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2000)   
Another example is found in the “Final Report of the Integrated Product Team on 
The Services’ Use of 10 U.S.C. 2371 ‘Other Transactions’ and 845 Prototype 
Authorities” which stated that: 
A program manager from the Air Force’s Wright Laboratory briefed the 
IPT on his experience in using an OT on the Active Matrix Liquid Crystal 
Display Manufacturing Technology project. This project was undertaken 
before the Air Force received authority for OTs, and the 2371 OT was 
therefore issued by DARPA. The Air Force however negotiated the 
agreement and manages the project. The program manager pointed out 
that this project could not have been accomplished without the use of a 
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2371 OT, which provided tremendous flexibility in the negotiation of the 
terms and conditions and provided relief from the Bayh-Dole patent 
requirements. The program manager did stress that these instruments are 
not a cure-all panacea, but a valuable tool to be used in the appropriate 
situation. He characterized OTs as “…excellent wrenches applied to the 
right bolts…” and he highlighted the need for responsible, trained, and 
motivated individuals in utilizing these tools. (Department of Defense, 
1996) 
Another example described an OT arrangement with a consortium to further 
advance technologies dealing with electromagnetics: 
On February 5, 2015, the U.S. Army Contracting Command issued a 
special notice announcing that the Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, Emerging Capabilities and Prototyping Office, 
intends to enter into a section 845 Prototype Other Transaction (“OT”) 
Agreement with the National Spectrum Consortium (“NSC”). This is the 
latest development in an initiative of the Department of Defense (“DOD”), 
first announced in March 2014, to provide government funding to support 
the research, development and maturation of technologies to enable 
advanced approaches to electromagnetic spectrum use. (Kelley Drye, 
2015) 
From electromagnetics to radio communications to liquid crysal displays, these 
are but a few examples of how OT agreements can be used in the DOD to advance 
technology in various fields of study. There are numerous other programs which have 
been enhanced  through use of an OT agreement and technologies that probably wouldn’t 
have been possible without these types of arrangements. As will be mentioned in the next 
Chapter, taking a deep dive into program specifics would be highly beneficial.  
E. SUMMARY 
In summary, this Chapter described the TIPS© analytical framework model 
authored by E. Cory Yoder and then analyzed OT authority with respect to the foundation 
of authorization and appropriation and then with respect to the pillars of personnel, 
platforms, and protocols. This Chapter also examined the various advantages/benefits and 
disadvantages/risks of OT authority. Finally, this Chapter provided a few examples of 
technologies that have been advanced as a result of entering into OT agreements.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Chapter will provide conclusions resulting from the research analysis on OT 
authority with respect to the primary and secondary research objectives. This Chapter 
will also provide recommendations for OT authority going forward. Recommendations 
will be framed in accordance with the TIPS© model of personnel, platforms, and 
protocols.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
As stated in Chapter I, the primary objective of this research is to present the 
reader with an in-depth understanding of OT authority by first examining the history of 
OTs and then presenting a thorough analysis of the current state of OT legislation. To 
accomplish this primary objective, the questions of what is the current state of OT 
authority and what does the law say and what implications this has were answered.   
The secondary objective of this research is to take a holistic view of all available 
literature on OT authority in order to determine if the current language is sufficient as 
stated or if additional changes are required. To accomplish the secondary objective, the 
questions of if the benefits can be quantified, do the benefits outweigh the risks, and 
should other agencies use this authority were analyzed. The question of what is the way 
forward with OT authority will be examined and recommendations will be provided.   
This research provided an overview of what an OT is not by examining its place 
in the contracting tool box in comparison to the traditional procurement contract, grant, 
and cooperative agreement. This research illustrated that OTs are important because 
threats to national security do exist. As stated by the USD/AT&L Frank Kendall (2016), 
“As I have said many times, our technological superiority is being challenged in ways we 
have not seen since the Cold War, and we must respond.” OTs provide a way for the 
government to attract the best and brightest to contribute to R&D efforts in advancement 
of state-of-the-art technology.   
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As stated by ranking member, Representative Michael McCaul, of the 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology of the 
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives: 
The Department of Defense has used this authority to enter into other 
transactions for many years within DARPA where they have had many 
incredible technological breakthroughs. These agreements are not used to 
purchase office supplies or other commodities for which a traditional 
contract is perfectly acceptable. Other transactions cover the development 
of technology to fill a particular unmet need, such as automated bio 
warfare agent detectors or a system to knock missiles out of the sky before 
they bring down an airliner. (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008) 
Representative McCaul drives home the point that OTs are not meant to be a solution to 
all acquisition woes; however, when the government requires capabilities from the 
commercial sector and those capabilities can best be met through an OT arrangement, 
that would be a specific situation in which OTs would be beneficial.   
 Chapter II examined how the environmental and market factors such as the Space 
Agreement Act of 1958 planted the original seeds for DOD’s OT authority. In addition, 
changes in the S&T community; commercial firms’ aversion to doing business with the 
government; and an environment conducive to acquisition reform fostered an atmosphere 
supportive to DOD securing OT authority. 
Chapter III examined the detailed legislative changes to DODs OT for prototype 
authority and took a deep dive into the implications of the 2016 NDAA. This research 
examined what principles remained the same and what changes were effected by the 
2016 NDAA. The OT for prototype legislation being made permanent represented a 
major accomplishment for DOD.   
Finally, Chapter IV provided an analysis of OT authority using the TIPS© 
analytical framework created by E. Cory Yoder. OT authority was reviewed in terms of 
the Three Integrative Pillars of personnel, platforms, and protocols. Perspectives from 
both advocates for and opponents against OT authority were also reviewed.   
In light of the research conducted, it was revealed that “The DOD also has not 
taken full advantage of ‘other transaction’ authority (OTA) for prototype projects” 
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(Coetzee, 2015). There are very few SMEs on OT authority and this could present a 
problem if the government fails to capture the resident knowledge from the OT SMEs. 
There is also a lack of robust training and changing culture to get stakeholders 
comfortable with using OT authority will take some time.   
With respect to platforms, the biggest challenge for the government has to do with 
advertising and getting the word out that OT agreements are a viable tool for commercial 
firms to engage with the government in advancing R&D. In terms of protocols, the 
research revealed that guidance exists but there is no single definitive guidance to 
creating OT agreements. 
There are numerous benefits to OT agreements such as flexibility, cost-sharing, 
innovative business relationships, the ability to attract non-traditional firms, and an 
increased ability to manage risks and uncertainties. On the other hand, there is the 
potential for abuse since OTs are not subject to the traditional safeguards such as FAR 
and DFARS clauses; however, that concern is not a guarantee of abuse. It merely signals 
potential and in fact, OT agreements do have negotiated terms and conditions. The 
difference is that each OT agreement is custom tailored for the specific situation. The 
research also revealed that capturing benefits in terms of concrete metrics is difficult at 
best. And, research has revealed that the concept of cost-sharing could be considered a 
risk, depending on one’s perspective.   
In conclusion, one only has to watch the news to see that the U.S. faces threats not 
only on the domestic front but also from foreign threats such as those from the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS). With that said, the U.S. has to be able to stay at the forefront of innovation and 
that is only possible if the government thinks outside of the box and leverages its 
investments in R&D by collaborating to the maximum extent possible with the 
commercial sector. OT agreements provide an attractive and unique authority that enables 
the government to attract these capability rich firms.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the 2016 NDAA took a giant leap in legitimizing OT authority by creating 
permanency and restoring the legislation to its original intent, there remain many areas of 
opportunities for improvement with respect to personnel, platforms, and protocols.   
1. Personnel 
a. Knowledge Management and Succession Planning: 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, there are few subject matter experts who are 
knowledgeable about OTs. Mr. Dunn, Mr. Ulrey, and Ms. Sidebottom provided a wealth 
of knowledge; however, it is critical that while these SMEs are still available for 
guidance, that agencies begin to manage the knowledge that resides with these 
individuals and to also conduct succession planning. The major question should be “Who 
will comprise the next generation of OT experts that will be advocates for this authority?” 
b. Training: 
Another recommendation is that the DAU needs to immediately update the web-
based courses that are available on the ACQTAS website and the “Other Transactions 
Guide for Prototype Projects” dated August 2002 also needs to be refreshed. Further, it 
would be interesting to understand how the agencies that are using OT authority are 
providing training. It is highly recommended that DOD centralize responsibility for 
training on OTs to ensure that a consistent message is being promulgated in accordance 
with the intent of the approved OT authority and current legislation. Once a cadre of 
qualified trainers have been developed, those trainers could level set all organizations that 
have been granted OT authority to ensure the DOD is creating OT agreements in a 
consistent manner.   
c. Agency and Government-Wide Working Groups 
Another recoomendation that would be beneficial for DOD components who use 
OT authority is to create agency and government-wide working groups. By getting 
together in a formal setting, the government can share OT best practices and lessons 
learned. It would also be beneficial for DOD to meet with civilian agencies who have OT 
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authority to also share best practices and lessons learned. While DOD and civilian 
agencies certainly have different missions, it would be useful to have this dialogue to see 
if improvements can be made to current practices so that the DOD can operate most 
efficiently.   
d. Historian for OTs 
Congress has long been interested in quantifying the benefits of OTs and will 
continue to want to quantify potential benefits. Another recommendation that would be 
beneficial is for each DOD component to have a historian who could document what 
programs/technologies were advanced due to creation of an OT arrangement. Since it is 
difficult to have standard metrics quantifying benefits, having a dedicated OT expert 
would allow for these technological advances to be captured, better understood, and 
consequently shared with interested stakeholders.   
2. Platforms 
a. Dedicated website for OTs 
It would be beneficial to have a one stop shop for everything about OTs—from a 
history of the legislation to sample agreements and program solicitations. A dedicated OT 
website could provide links to training and could also highlight DOD programs created as 
a result of OT agreements. This website could host all the relevant policy and protocols 
as well as provide points of contact for additional information.   
b. Advertisement 
Mr. Ulrey (personal communications, May 23, 2016) and Ms. Sidebottom 
(personal communications, May 23, 2016) have indicated that advertising has really been 
the biggest challenge with respect to OT authority. A recommendation would be to have 
a dedicated portal for advertising OTs that targets a different customer base than the FBO 
website. The working groups could prove to be useful in framing suggestions/forums for 
how to best advertise OT opportunities.   
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3. Protocols 
The DOD has issued a guidebook for OT for prototypes; however, it is outdated 
and requires updating to include the recent legislative changes. While there is no single 
definitive guide to creating OTs, in line with the recommendation for an OT website, 
creating updated protocols would be beneficial to those who are new to creating OT 
agreements.   
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
This research provided a general overview that should be helpful to readers 
completely unfamiliar with OT authority. It is the hope of the author that this research 
allowed the reader to understand how this authority compares to the traditional 
procurement contract, grant, or cooperative agreement and to understand its importance 
in accomplishing the mission of the DOD. It is also the author’s hope that the reader 
understands the environmental and market factors which led to DOD gaining this 
authority and the important impacts of the 2016 NDAA. The reader should also be aware 
of the perceived benefits and risks associated with this authority and to be able to 
understand both the advocate and contrarian viewpoints. As a follow-up to this research, 
it would be beneficial for DOD to conduct a more in-depth examination of specific 
programs enacted through OT agreements at each defense agency that has been granted 
OT authority. The RAND study was an initial effort in reviewing program specific data 
in order to understand if it is possible to quantify the benefits. Doing a long term 
thorough program specific review would be very useful in understanding and advertising 





APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW WITH SCOTT ULREY, DEPUTY 
DIRECTOR, DARPA CMO. 
A. Historical: 
 
1. What was the role of DARPA’s Contract Management Office in 
creating and advancing Other Transaction (OT) authority within the 
Department of Defense? 
DARPA was the first agency within DOD to receive OT authority. Mr. Richard 
Dunn was the General Counsel at DARPA at the time and he worked with 
congressional staffers to create the language. There was concern at the time 
that DARPA wasn’t reaching the best performers, particularly, commercial 
companies and DARPA wanted to tap into more than the traditional DOD 
contractors. For example, there were unique companies, like the Intels of the 
world, who refused to do business with the government.   
 
2. What changes have been made with OT authority over the years?  
How has the language and the law changed? 
The original authority was granted in November 1989 with the Fiscal Year 
1990 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This was primarily 
designed to promote dual use technology, meaning that the technology would 
have both commercial and military applications. This original authority was 
meant to tap into commercial companies and DARPA tried to engage with as 
many of these companies as we possibly could. Advancing technology was 
the primary purpose for OT authority. I like to think of OT agreements as 
“mission focused” or “good faith” instruments. 
 
The majority of legislative changes really pertains to OT for prototype 
authority. My 2016 DARPA business conference slides detail the specific 
changes to OT authority legislation over the years. Since OT for Prototype 
authority was originally granted in Section 845, the OT for Prototype authority 
has come to be known colloquially as “845s” even though changes to this 
authority have appeared in different sections.   
 
Another note is Technology Investment Agreements (TIAs) are governed by 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Research and Engineering 
(R&E) while prototyping is governed by the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (OUSD) for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) under the 





3. What was the impetus behind the need for OT authority? 
There was a need for innovation to tap into commercial technologies that 
were more advanced than DOD. At the time, DOD was unable to tap into 
those companies. Those firms would sell products to the government but 
would not do R&D with the government. There were several reasons that 
commercial companies didn’t want to do business with the government. One 
of the reasons had to do with auditing, commercial companies didn’t want to 
have to deal with defense auditors and wanted to use commercial practices 
instead of traditional government requirements. Other reasons included overly 
burdensome regulations such as cost principles and regulations surrounding 
intellectual property, patents, and property management systems.   
 
4. Has availability of this authority increased the number of contractors 
proposing on Research & Development efforts? 
Yes, as long as companies are aware at the solicitation stage that the 
government is offering OT agreements as a potential instrument. 
Unfortunately, awareness has been the biggest drawback to the whole 
process. While traditional government contractors are aware of the Federal 
Business Opportunities (FBO) website, not all commercial companies read 
FBO.   
 
5. How long did it take to get the authority for DOD? 
Within two years, from 1987 to 1989.   
 
6. What “non-traditional” companies has this authority attracted? 
OT authority has attracted numerous “non-traditional” companies. The 















For OTs for research, which generally results in a TIA, those agreements are 
generally for dual use technologies and in order to do a TIA, there is a 
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requirement of participation by a for-profit organization. When working with 
universities, the tendency is to enter into grants. However, one scenario using 
‘OT for Other’ could be entering into an agreement with a consortia of 
universities. One could also have an OT for other agreement with a group 
consisting on non-profit organizations. You could have joint solicitations with 
industry. You could lease out R&D equipment.  You could loan out 
government property and eventually, the company would own that property 
depending on the terms stated in the agreement.  Another example would be 
technology development programs with foreign governments. Foreign 
governments have approached the government in response to a Broad 
Agency Announcement (BAA) because they have a great technology and 
want to enter into an agreement. A foreign government is not a for-profit entity 
and cannot enter into a traditional procurement contract, grant, or cooperative 
agreement; therefore, an OT for other arrangement would be a possible 
solution. 
 
7. What stakeholders were involved in crafting the OT authority? 
As mentioned earlier, Mr. Richard Dunn, General Counsel at DARPA was 
critical in working with Congress to craft the original OT authority. DARPA 
CMO had a strong supporting role through myself, John Ablard, and Elaine 
Ely. Dick Kuyath at 3M was also instrumental.   
 
8. Have any responses been received from industry on this authority? 
Yes, after agreements have been negotiated, I have received comments from 




B. Current State of OT authority and law: 
 
1. What is the current state of OT authority under the 2016 National 
Defense Authorization Act?   
The current state of OT authority under the 2016 NDAA is that the OT for 
prototype authority has been made permanent. Please refer to my 2016 
DARPA business conference slides which detail the specific changes to OT 
authority legislation over the years.   
 
2. How does the current state differ from previous NDAA’s? 
Please refer to my 2016 DARPA business conference slides which detail the 
specific changes to OT authority legislation over the years.   
 
3. What Department of Defense agencies use this authority? 
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I believe OT authority is being used by DARPA, the military services, the 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
(DTRA). 
 
4. Do any socioeconomic policies apply to OT’s? 
OT agreements still have to comply with the laws of the land. For example, 
companies still have to comply with any Equal Employment Opportunity 
(EEO) laws and regulations. However, with respect to set-aside requirements 
or small business goals, there are no set aside requirements or small 
business targets. The reason is that with R&D, the over-arching goal is for the 
government to obtain the best technologies and innovations from whomever 
is the most capable.   
 
DARPA has not used OTs with the STTR program but OTs have been used 
in the SBIR program.   
Under SBIRs, the company is required to deliver a prototype and a small 
business does not have a cost share requirement. I offer up OTs as an 
alternative to contracts or grants when a company may not have an 
accounting system and is a commercial versus a traditional defense 
contractor. I use OTs when companies are commercially focused small 
businesses and OTs are used infrequently, perhaps about five times per year 
and I strive for a 30-day turnaround.  
 
5. Are there any legal recourses in cases of a competitive OT in which a 
contractor might dispute the evaluation criteria - Is this an 
issue?  Can you sole source?  Have any legal issues arisen from 
these types of arrangements? 
From my experience at DARPA, having worked with over 1000+ program 
solicitations and over 500 myself, I have not encountered any legal issues 
ever. OT agreements are not protestable in the same sense that traditional 
procurement contracts are protestable. Companies can submit challenges but 
there is no formal protest forum. You can sole source OTs; however, it has 
been my experience that most OTs are competed off Broad Agency 
Announcements (BAA’s). Also, solicitations are not referred to as Requests 
for Proposals (RFPs) or Requests for Quotes (RFQs) but rather program 
solicitations are issued.   
 
6. What clauses are traditionally included in OT arrangements?  How 
do these clauses differ from traditional FAR based contract clauses? 
Traditional Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) based clauses are not 
required but one can always paraphrase from a FAR clause. DARPA has 
several sample agreements depending on the circumstances but many 
agreements include clauses on termination, disputes, patents, data rights, 
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and foreign access to technology. An agreement would also review the 
management structure, scope of the program, funding issues, the statement 
of work (SOW), and milestone schedule. An OT agreement, in general, has 
about 10–15 clauses, which is far less than a traditional procurement 
contract.   
 
7. Are OTs subject to the same bid protest regulations? 
No.   
 
8. What training is available for 1102s on OT’s?  
Zero. Well, there are DAU online courses but they are outdated and need to 




C. Efficacy (is the authority working): 
 
1. Is there a way to quantify the benefits of using this authority? 
Unfortunately, there is no concrete formula to quantifying the benefits of using 
this authority. It really is necessary to examine the technologies that are being 
developed. OTs are used when it is necessary to attract commercial 
companies because of its inherent flexibility.   
 
2. Do you have any examples illustrating benefit of using OT? 
One example that I can provide is Global Hawk, which is up and running. It 
took 7 years to develop the airframe versus a typical 20 year timeline. Also, 
there was a streamlined requirements document.   
 
DOD also used OT authority to help develop high definitions systems such as 
flat panel displays. There have also been many advances in microelectronics, 
the biotech industry, and with pharmaceutical companies.   




D. The Path Forward: 
 
1. What implications do the recent changes per the 2016 NDAA on OT 
have for DOD going forward? 
The current legislation is written in the spirit of the original intent. One issue 
with the old authority is that many Contracting Officer’s would not use OTs 
unless they could define that the prototype was directly relevant to the 
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offensive version of “weapons or weapons” system. Now, the language has 
been broadened.   
 
The original language has been expanded to include provisions for small 
businesses and non-traditional contractors.   
 
Also, the government can now more easily move into a follow-on production 
contract provided the parties complied with the initial agreement. And, this 
can be done either through an OT agreement or a FAR based contract.   
 
2. What are advocates’ point of view for using OT authority? What are 
opponents’ point of view on using OT’s? 
Advocates enjoy that OT agreements are completely flexible and negotiable 
and that you essentially start from a “clean/blank” sheet of paper. There is 
less red tape and virtually no bureaucracy. Using OT agreements results in a 
greater collaborative team approach.   
 
Opponents point to a lack of oversight and a lack of controls. Opponents are 
generally wary of that which is different and they also cite a lack of metrics as 
a risk area.   
 
3. What are the potential benefits and risks of using this authority?  
Benefits we have covered, the main one being flexibility. A risk is that if both 
the government and the company do not approach OT agreements from a 
“good faith” perspective, it would be easy to trip each other up. OT 
agreements are very much dependent on mutual trust. 
   
4. Are other agencies using this authority? If yes, why?  If no, why? 
Yes, DHS/TSA, NASA, FAA, DOT, DOE, IARPA, HHS… They are using this 
authority because of its flexibility and to attract the best resources. If agencies 
are not using this authority or if they do not have this option, they are limiting 




APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW WITH DIANE SIDEBOTTOM, SENIOR 
POLICY ANALYST, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, INC. 
A. Historical: 
 
1. What was the role of DARPA’s Contract Management Office in 
creating and advancing Other Transaction (OT) authority within the 
Department of Defense? 
DARPA was the first agency within DOD to receive OT authority – the 2371 
authority. Mr. Richard Dunn was the General Counsel at DARPA at the time 
and he used to work at NASA. He thought it was a great authority and that it 
wasn’t being used in the right way and wanted to bring this same authority to 
DOD.  There was a strong relationship between the GC and the Contracts 
Management Office (CMO). Scott Ulrey and John Ablard were strong 
supporters of OT authority. 
 
The government wanted the ability to be able to move quickly and the FAR 
was not user friendly. The government was falling further behind in terms of 
insight versus oversight. The government wanted to know what industry 
thought they could do. In the early 1990s, there was a technology 
reinvestment project (TRP) which was a task force run by DARPA which 
promoted OTs.   
 
OTs represented an opportunity for joint investment in developing dual use 
technologies.   
 
2. What changes have been made with OT authority over the years?  
How has the language and the law changed? 
The original authority was granted in November 1989 with the Fiscal Year 
1990 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The OT for research 
language cited in the original 2371 legislation hasn’t changed much. The 
majority of legislative changes really pertains to OT for prototype authority. 
Scott Ulrey’s 2016 DARPA business conference slides detail the specific 
changes to OT authority legislation over the years.  
  
3. What was the impetus behind the need for OT authority? 
The government was starting to see large segments of certain industries 
walking away from the government. Companies didn’t need or want to do 
business with the government, largely because of the rules and regulations 
surrounding intellectual property and cost accounting principles.   
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Research and Development (R&D) is different than buying products or 
widgets. In fact, R&D has its own section of the FAR. With that said, the 
government was finding that it no longer had the same resources as those 
available to commercial firms and had to find a way to tap into the commercial 
sector.   
 
4. Has availability of this authority increased the number of contractors 
proposing on Research & Development efforts? 
Unfortunately, in recent times, it does not seem that OT agreements are used 
as frequently as in the early days. One of the biggest challenges has been 
advertising, sometimes OTs have not been offered as a choice. There was 
much better advertising in the early days. Once personnel left that were 
familiar with OTs, it seems that use of OTs dropped. It is natural for people to 
gravitate towards instruments that are familiar to them.  
  
5. How long did it take to get the authority for DOD? 
I wasn’t at DARPA when the original authority was crafted but I believe it took 
approximately two years, from 1987 to 1989. The OT for prototypes came 
shortly after.   
 
6. What “non-traditional” companies has this authority attracted? 
There are too many to name individually – I concur with the list that Scott 
Ulrey provided. Of course, there are numerous other companies.   
 
7. What stakeholders were involved in crafting the OT authority? 
As mentioned earlier, Mr. Richard Dunn, General Counsel at DARPA was 
critical in working with Congress to craft the original OT authority. DARPA 
CMO had a strong supporting role through myself, John Ablard, and Scott 
Ulrey.   
 
8. Have any responses been received from industry on this authority? 
At one point, there was a Request for Information that indicated that many 
companies liked OT authority because they liked the ability to negotiate as 
well as the flexibility. The more traditional contractors did not like the cost 
share requirement.  
  
 
B. Current State of OT authority and law: 
 
1. What is the current state of OT authority under the 2016 National 
Defense Authorization Act?   
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The current state of OT authority under the 2016 NDAA is that the OT for 
prototype authority has been made permanent. Please refer to Scott Ulrey’s 
2016 DARPA business conference slides which detail the specific changes to 
OT authority legislation over the years.   
 
2. How does the current state differ from previous NDAA’s? 
Please refer to Scott Ulrey’s 2016 DARPA business conference slides which 
detail the specific changes to OT authority legislation over the years.   
 
In a general sense, there is now a broader definition of “non-traditional” 
contractor and the terms for follow-on production has changed. The major 
change is that this authority is no longer temporary, it is permanent. Also, 
people previously were hung up on the definition of “weapons or weapons 
systems” and this definition has also been broadened and widens the pool of 
applicability.   
 
3. What Department of Defense agencies use this authority? 
I believe OT authority is being used by DARPA, the military services, the 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
(DTRA). I also believe that the Army is using OTs at Picatinny Arsenal in New 
Jersey.   
 
4. Do any socioeconomic policies apply to OT’s? 
OT agreements still have to comply with any laws with respect to doing 
business in the United States. For example, companies still have to comply 
with any Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), civil rights, or minimum wage 
laws and regulations. However, with respect to set-aside requirements or 
small business goals, there are no set aside requirements or small business 
targets.   
 
5. Are there any legal recourses in cases of a competitive OT in which a 
contractor might dispute the evaluation criteria - Is this an 
issue?  Can you sole source?  Have any legal issues arisen from 
these types of arrangements? 
OT agreements are not protestable in the same sense that traditional 
procurement contracts are protestable. Companies can submit challenges but 
there is no formal protest forum. You can sole source OTs; however, it has 
been my experience that most OTs are competed off Broad Agency 
Announcements (BAA’s). It has been my observation that the government 
handles informal feedback sessions very well and that the government is very 





6. What clauses are traditionally included in OT arrangements?  How 
do these clauses differ from traditional FAR based contract clauses? 
(same response as Scott Ulrey) Traditional Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) based clauses are not required but one can always paraphrase from a 
FAR clause. DARPA has several sample agreements depending on the 
circumstances but many agreements include clauses on termination, 
disputes, patents, data rights, and foreign access to technology. An 
agreement would also review the management structure, scope of the 
program, funding issues, the statement of work (SOW), and milestone 
schedule. An OT agreement, in general, has about 10–15 clauses, which is 
far less than a traditional procurement contract.   
 
(added) Of course, any civil rights clauses, as appropriate. 
 
7. Are OTs subject to the same bid protest regulations? 
No, because OTs are not subject to the Competition in Contracting Act 
(CICA).   
 
8. What training is available for 1102s on OT’s?  
Not much. Well, there are DAU online courses but they are outdated and 
need to be updated. When OTs first started, Rick Dunn and John Ablard were 
often requested to speak at industry events and were also invited to speak to 
individual organizations. Now, a lot of the training is by word of mouth. Scott 




C. Efficacy (is the authority working): 
 
1. Is there a way to quantify the benefits of using this authority? 
One would have to do a comprehensive historical survey of all OTs issued 
and also think about the question “What does success mean?.” Even failure 
can be a success in R&D because one can learn from failures. Success not 
only means attracting companies that previously did not do business with the 
government but also getting those companies with experience in dealing with 
the government to work differently with the government.   
 
2. Do you have any examples illustrating benefit of using OT? 
One example that I can provide is regarding the Arsenal Ship program, a joint 
program with the Navy. This was an autonomous vertical arsenal and there 
was a rolling down select. There was a company that was the creator and 
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supplier of launch tubes and was required to supply tubes to each company. 
New companies ended up making their own tubes and even the creator and 
supplier of the tubes re-engineered their own tubes. This is an example of 
how companies made their own decisions rather than the Government 




D. The Path Forward: 
 
1. What implications do the recent changes per the 2016 NDAA on OT 
have for DOD going forward? 
The definition of who is considered a non-traditional contractor has changed. 
The space has been broadened dramatically.   
 
Also, the government can now more easily move into a follow-on production 
contract provided the parties complied with the initial agreement. The 
government can be in low-rate initial production (LRIP) faster. The 
government can negotiate production quantities.   
 
The 2016 NDAA made the authority permanent; therefore, the government 
doesn’t have to worry about temporary authority any longer.   
 
2. What are advocates’ point of view for using OT authority? What are 
opponents’ point of view on using OT’s? 
(same answer as Scott Ulrey) Advocates enjoy that OT agreements are 
completely flexible and negotiable and that you essentially start from a “clean/
blank” sheet of paper. There is less red tape and virtually no bureaucracy. 
Using OT agreements results in a greater collaborative team approach.   
 
Opponents point to a lack of oversight and a lack of controls. Opponents are 
generally wary of that which is different and they also cite a lack of metrics as 
a risk area.   
 
3. What are the potential benefits and risks of using this authority?  
Benefits include flexibility and that the government can behave like the rest of 
the world behaves. Times have changed so much that companies don’t 
necessarily need government work but the government needs innovation. We 
(the government) can’t live without working with commercial companies.  
 
Some risks include a cultural problem in the sense of getting the government 
and contractors to behave differently. Contractors sometimes don’t trust the 
government because they think the government has a secret agenda.   
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Another risk is that you don’t have the safeguards/backup of the FAR. The 
Contracting Officer really needs to think about what needs to go into the 
agreement. Thought needs to happen about not just the life of the agreement 
but the life span of whatever the government is trying to make. For example, 
intellectual property lasts forever. Therefore, what you are creating matters.   
You want to negotiate what you need early on.   
 
Some things that contractors dislike about working with that government is 
that (1) it takes too long; (2) cost accounting standards; (3) contracting by 
regulation – don’t really negotiate terms and conditions; and (4) regulations 
concerning intellectual property.   
 
4. Are other agencies using this authority? If yes, why?  If no, why? 
Yes, DHS/TSA, NASA, FAA, DOT, DOE, IARPA, HHS, DOI… They are using 
this authority because of its flexibility and to attract the best resources. 
Agencies are using this authority for different reasons. For example, FAA has 
their own acquisition management system and uses the authority for airlines 
and airports.   
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APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD DUNN, EXPERT 
CONSULTANT, NATIONAL SECURITY TECHNOLOGY 
ACCELERATOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 
A. Historical: 
 
1. What was the role of DARPA’s Contract Management Office in 
creating and advancing Other Transaction (OT) authority within the 
Department of Defense? 
With respect to creation, the DARPA CMO was not involved. In May 1988, a 
letter was sent to the Pentagon with concerns that the government was not 
attracting the best and the brightest. This was sent to DARPA and came to 
my attention. I said that they (DOD) couldn’t do what they wanted to do with 
the current authority. At the time, I worked as General Counsel at DARPA.   
 
At the time, the Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), 
Senator Nunn, met with the Director of DARPA. I worked directly with 
congressional staffers on the original legislation. I really wanted OTs to 
become a routine part of doing business with DARPA. I thought CMO should 
be directly involved in advancing OT. The then Director of CMO, Ron 
Register, was supportive of doing things differently and was supportive of 
getting OTs established at DARPA.   
 
2. What changes have been made with OT authority over the years?  
How has the language and the law changed? 
The original authority was granted in November 1989 with the Fiscal Year 
1990 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) under Section 10 of United 
States Code 2371 and was granted to DARPA only. The authority was then 
amended to include all military departments and then was amended with 
Section 845 that specified prototype authority.   
 
The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act clarified procurement 
contracts versus assistance instruments such as grants and cooperative 
agreements. Procurement contracts were for goods and services while grants 
and cooperative agreements were for a public purpose.   
 
In the Science and Technology field, the government is not procuring 
products, the major goal is to advance state of the art. There is a need to 
engender collaboration. 
 
The 2000 NDAA introduced the requirement for cost sharing. The original 
authority did not have the requirement for cost sharing.   
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There is also a significant change with the language that defines what OTs 
can be used for. It used to be specific to “weapons and weapons systems” but 
now has a broader definition and is closest to what was originally intended.  
To track the changes, go to 10 U.S.C. 2371, the actual code, and in the notes 
to section 2371, you can track the amendments.   
 
3. What was the impetus behind the need for OT authority? 
See answer to question #1. I interned at the Apollo Command and 
Procurement office in Houston and noted that procurement there didn’t look 
like procurement anywhere else. I became interested in understanding “Why 
do we do things in the way we do things in the government?”  You get 
restrictions from the FAR.   
 
There is good information in the February 2007 LMI Consulting study titled 
“An Analysis of Special Instruments for Department of Defense Acquisition 
and Assistance:  Other Transactions for Prototype Projects and Technology 
Investment Agreements” which I will send. 
 
4. Has availability of this authority increased the number of contractors 
proposing on Research & Development efforts? 
This authority definitely helped to grow the R&D base at that time. There was 
a technology reinvestment project which was a multi-party consortium project. 
Unfortunately, 2006 was the last annual report to Congress. DARPA received 
the initial authority and Gazelle Microsystems was the first OT agreement 
signed and executed.   
 
5. How long did it take to get the authority for DOD? 
The original authority was crafted very quickly and enacted in 1989.   
 
6. What “non-traditional” companies has this authority attracted? 
From the smallest to the biggest companies, this authority attracted interest. 
Industry created a group called the “Integrated Dual-use Commercial 
Companies (IDCC)” whose purpose was to promote use of OTs in R&D 
contracting. Firms such as DuPont, Monsanto, and 3M spent billions on their 
own R&D. I will send briefings from IDCC meetings.   
 
7. What stakeholders were involved in crafting the OT authority? 
As mentioned earlier, I worked with Congress to craft the original OT 
authority. The driving force was on the Senate side with Senator Nunn and 
Senator Bingaman of New Mexico championing OT authority. Senator Warner 
also was an advocate of this authority.   
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8. Have any responses been received from industry on this authority? 




B. Current State of OT authority and law: 
 
1. What is the current state of OT authority under the 2016 National 
Defense Authorization Act?   
The current state of OT authority under the 2016 NDAA is that the OT for 
prototype authority has been made permanent. There is also simplified 
provisioning for follow-on production.   
 
2. How does the current state differ from previous NDAA’s? 
The notion of cost-sharing is retained which emphasizes the role of the non-
traditional contractor. In a general sense, there is now a broader definition of 
“non-traditional” contractor and the terms for follow-on production has 
changed. The major change is that this authority is no longer temporary, it is 
permanent.   
 
I would take a different approach to cost-sharing as this can disincentivize 
traditional companies from working in OT arrangements.   
 
3. What Department of Defense agencies use this authority? 
I believe OT authority is being used by DARPA, the military services, the 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
(DTRA).   
 
4. Do any socioeconomic policies apply to OT’s? 
OT agreements still have to comply with any laws with respect to doing 
business in the United States. For example, companies still have to comply 
with Title IV of the Civil Rights Act and export control laws. However, with 
respect to set-aside requirements or small business goals, there are no set 
aside requirements or small business targets.   
 
5. Are there any legal recourses in cases of a competitive OT in which a 
contractor might dispute the evaluation criteria - Is this an 
issue?  Can you sole source?  Have any legal issues arisen from 
these types of arrangements? 
OT agreements are not protestable in the same sense that traditional 
procurement contracts are protestable. They are not protestable under GAO 
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because OTs are not subject to CICA. I know of one TRP project that 
complained but the government prevailed. GAO has rejected protests of OTs.   
 
6. What clauses are traditionally included in OT arrangements?  How 
do these clauses differ from traditional FAR based contract clauses? 
I fought against having a model OT agreement but both industry and 
government wanted a model. Clean sheet paper contracting is hard. After the 
initial Gazelle agreement garnered so much press, there was a rule that all 
OTs were to be sent to DPAP for approval. Clauses should be second to 
achieving the objectives of the parties. It is more important to get people in a 
room to agree on objectives before actually negotiating the agreements. One 
clause that is important is foreign access to technology.   
 
7. Are OTs subject to the same bid protest regulations? 
No, because OTs are not subject to the Competition in Contracting Act 
(CICA).   
 
8. What training is available for 1102s on OT’s?  
Not enough. I gave a course for the Army at Picatinny Arsenal about a year 




C. Efficacy (is the authority working): 
 
1. Is there a way to quantify the benefits of using this authority? 
At one point, there was a DD Form that was required to be filled out on each 
prototype project in an attempt to gather metrics. There are tangible benefits 
other than monetary benefits. Refer to “The Army Lawyer” article and the 
Coopers and Lybrand study.   
 
2. Do you have any examples illustrating benefit of using OT? 
With Gazelle, there was an opportunity to earn royalties and with the TRP, 




D. The Path Forward: 
 
1. What implications do the recent changes per the 2016 NDAA on OT 
have for DOD going forward? 
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The 2016 NDAA made the authority permanent; therefore, this takes away 
the excuse that the authority is temporary. The authority is permanent and 
streamlined and really serves as congressional endorsement of the authority. 
Follow-on production is streamlined. This language has overcome the narrow 
scope of “weapons and weapons systems.”  
 
2. What are advocates’ point of view for using OT authority? What are 
opponents’ point of view on using OT’s? 
Advocates believe that DOD is heavily regulated and has expensive, non-
value added processes. Before World War II, there were very few companies 
with a defense base. Post WWII, industries such as those dealing with 
nuclear or jet engines became a monopoly with the military.   
 
Opponents point to a lack of oversight and a lack of controls or safeguards 
although the notion of whether these safeguards actually safeguard hasn’t yet 
been tested. The culture is not conducive to using OTs. Refer to my 2009 
paper for specific examples such as the Future Combat System (FCS).   
 
3. What are the potential benefits and risks of using this authority?  
See answer to question #2 above.   
 
4. Are other agencies using this authority? If yes, why?  If no, why? 
Yes, DHS/TSA, NASA, FAA, DOT, DOE, IARPA, HHS, DOI… Refer to CRS 
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